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Abstract
The Effect of Natural Disasters on Minority Voter Turnout, 1990-2016
By
Gary Hawk
Claremont Graduate University: 2021
This paper studies four natural disaster categories—climatological, geophysical,
hydrological, and meteorological—and their impact upon four elections—gubernatorial,
House, President, and Senate—for the 1990-2016 time period in 3,113 US counties,
excluding Alaska. The research focused on which natural disasters impacted minor-
ity voters—Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Two or more races—if
disasters affected the individual elections. Natural disasters provide mixed results
on US election outcomes depending upon disaster, election, and the minority group.
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1 Introduction
Natural disasters are a part of life on planet earth. Since humans earliest writings,
disasters are part of human history. Some of the earliest stories of recorded history
are the hydrological Sumerian flood of Gilgamesh and the Biblical flood. These records
continued through the writings of Voltaire and the geophysical November 1755 Portugal
earthquake and tsunami with the accompanying destruction of Lisbon. The events of
natural disasters are both local and international events e.g., the 2004 Indian Ocean
earthquake and tsunami killed over 227,000 people and impacted 15 countries, Mt. St.
Helen’s eruption in Washington state in 1980 killed 57 people with volcanic ash extending
to Edmonton Alberta, Canada. The “Little Ice Age,” a climatological disaster, impacted
the Northern Hemisphere for nearly 500 years from about 1300 to 1850. In recent memory
were two different destructive disasters. Thirty years ago, 17 January 1994, a ferocious
6.7 Richter earthquake caused $±30 billion in damages (1994 dollars) in Northridge, CA
and meanwhile the state still awaits the “Big One.” Hurricane Michael (2018), was a
storm for the record books and was more powerful at landfall than hurricanes Katrina or
Andrew striking the states of Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia,
and Maryland on October 10, a few weeks before the 2018 elections (Rice, 2018).
The election disaster nightmare became a reality befor the Super Tuesday presidential
election of March 2020. Late Monday 2 March and in the predawn and early hours of
election day Tuesday 3 March, supercell thunderstorms (a least common type of thun-
derstorm that produces severe weather, damaging winds, very large hail, and sometimes
weak to violent tornadoes that may last for several hours) caused tornadoes across South-
east Missouri, southern Kentucky, Tennessee, and central Alabama. An EF-3 tornado
(136-165 mph winds) travelled over 60 miles across Middle Tennessee causing destruction
with hundreds of injuries and 25 fatalities (NOAA, 2020). Davidson County, TN had
to relocate 15 polling stations, and some of them required electoral generators, a few
election workers were trapped in their homes, and a judge extended polling station hours
(Gee et al., 2020). This event demonstrates the saliency of this study. Disasters happen
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randomly, oftentimes without much or any warning, and cause havoc and they will and
do impact elections and voter turnout.
What about the voters when a disaster strikes? Depending upon the disaster many
voters are forced to evacuate because their homes are uninhabitable. Forced to flee under
extreme duress the possibility exists of failure to retrieve important identification docu-
ments needed to vote. Whittington-Kaminski (2019) writes, “Hurricanes are becoming
as frequent as elections, after all, they are in the same season.” This is not just true of
hurricanes as the 2020 Super Tuesday tornados showed.
On top of an already challenging election year because of the ongoing
pandemic and a polarized political landscape, climate catastrophes present
yet another obstacle to the polls. As of October 26, an estimated 6,000 Lake
Charles resident have yet to return to their homes since evacuating in late
August—and again in October—to escape back-to-back hurricanes. In New
Orleans and other parts of Louisiana hit by the most recent hurricane, Zeta,
polling places have been affected by widespread power outages.
On the West Coast, entire communities have had to evacuate to shel-
ters and other parts of their states in California, Oregon and Colorado due
to unprecedented wildfires. In some cases, Covid-19 adds an extra layer of
complexity as traditional shelters were closed (Poon, 2020).
Coupled with these living conditions, as noted above, from natural disasters the cost
of voting is higher for those people who are lower in socioeconomic standing. These
hurricane and wildfire survivors have lived as refugees, many living without jobs, and
then have to face either registering to vote or voting. This cost of voting, for disaster
victims includes indirect information costs, the direct costs of lost wages and time in
both registering and the physical act of voting, appears probabilistically insurmountable.
The usual factors—socioeconomic status, race, education, and demographics—are the
common factors when political scientists study the inequality of political participation
as these elements favor those over those who are the less advantaged citizens (Lijphart,
1997; Vowels et al., 2017). Debate will continue if these usual variables are the correct
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way to measure political inactivity but this study shows natural disasters do have a role
in the equation’s theoretical list of variables.
These disasters offer a “natural” experiment into voting behavior by analyzing the
voter turnout ex post the disaster and ex ante under ceteris paribus. Obviously, no study
can get inside the minds of voters but the turnout votes do provide an example of what the
majority of voter’s opinion is about the two candidates. As the literatures shows, voters
will either punish or reward the incumbent for the actions taken during and after the
disaster before the election (Abney and Hill, 1966; Arceneaux and Stein, 2006; Ashworth
et al., 2018; Flores and Smith, 2012; Healy and Malhotra, 2010, 2009; Lay, 2009).
While some research has studied natural disasters at the macro or case level (Abney
and Hill, 1966; Artés, 2014; Bodet et al., 2016; Gatrell and Bierly, 2002; Sinclair et al.,
2011), this study focuses at the smallest measurement unit available, US counties over a
26 year time period. This research studies the microlevel county election turnout of four
election types on various election cycles. This study’s dependent variable (DV) is y1 =
total election race votes
sum of potential population by race based on 3,113 US counties (Federal Information Processing
Standards) FIPS code and House, President (POTUS), Senate, and governor elections
for the time period 1990-2016. The model analyzes the time before a disaster t0 and after
a disaster t+1 with a difference in difference analysis for the 26-year period.
This study does not offer solutions to election day scenarios under natural disaster
conditions but instead, shows how natural disasters impact electoral turnout of minorities
and provides understanding in how natural disasters affect all races and ethnicities at
times of elections. Why study minorities? Political power, as the literatures shows, favors
citizens with money and time. Those with these resources possess advantages in political
participation either as candidates or involved citizens. Minority populations because of
their socioeconomic standing have less of those assets so the study of how natural disasters
impact their voting behavior becomes salient. Natural disasters do affect citizens equally
but minorities disproportionately compared to Whites. More importantly, in a close
election, this study shows how a disaster impacts minority voter’s turnout which could
snatch a political victory from the jaws of defeat if candidates recognize this impact.
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It follows with devastating disasters how such an event could impact an election. If the
disaster occurred a short time before the election, citizens may not have the opportunity
to register at the last minute, show proof of ID, election sites may no longer exist, and
transportation becomes unavailable for voting participation. What would happen if the
“Big One” struck California before a Presidential election? California has 55 electoral
votes, enough to possibly influence a close election by impacting election turnout including
the county or counties conducting an election. Such an impossible seeming idea then
becomes an unforeseen Constitutional question. (Two interesting papers, James and
Alihodzic (2020), (Morley, 2017) discuss postponing elections in the event of natural
disasters or terrorist attacks.). The purpose of this study evaluates the impact of natural
disasters on voting behavior. Chapter two discusses natural disaster literature relating
to natural disasters and voting. Chapter three the theoretical approach to the research.
Chapter four illustrates the election analysis and chapter five has the study’s discussion
and conclusions.
1.1 Research questions
The study of natural disasters covers a range of disciplines, all studying the prevention
and impact of damages on social dynamics. Political science is the focus of research for
this analysis. The research questions are:
• Which natural disasters have a statistically significant effect on minority voter
turnout?
• Which natural disasters have a statistical significance upon the four major US
elections: House, Senate, POTUS, and governor?
The purpose of these questions are two-fold. First, is obviously the natural disaster
issue because natural disasters will occur and are non-preventable so which minority
voting behaviors are the most affected. Second, minorities are typically lumped together
into one variable in voting analyses regardless of the distinguishing differences between
them. For example, Blacks generally do not have language barriers when compared to
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Hispanics. Blacks born in this country speak English. Not all Asians and Hispanics have
this opportunity. This study separates them for closer analysis. This separation allows
comparisons and contrasts between racial groups and illustrates what Verba (1996) wrote
that embedded in American society is political inequality which this study attempts
to investigate. Democracy depends upon the relationship between government elites
responsiveness to the citizens and equal responsiveness by citizens to the elites hence, one
person, one vote. However, if the basic principle of voting breaks down democracy has,
the ruled are ignored by the elites and the ruled ignore the rulers. For underrepresented
or invisible citizens like minorities this can create major problems. If citizens withdraw
from and withhold energy from political participation a major dilemma occurs and with
certainty those more privileged citizens, i.e., higher incomes, more wealth and education,
will fill the vacuum left by those not engaged.
Brady et al. (1995) shows that those who are more engaged in the political process
may have two resources from those who disengage, time and money. These two resources
quickly divide society, those who have and those who have not. Each of these two as-
sets are further divided. Those with money have the discretionary funds and are less
constrained in donating to candidates and parties and those without are restricted from
the political process. The time to study candidates and issues, physically participate in
rallies and meetings, again becomes available only to those who have either the ability to
create time and not to those who lack time. People with excess can save, but time is one
asset that is constantly used to completion. These two simple assets separate the rich,
poor, and minorities in US elections. Of course, both assets are relative because one may
have wealth and riches and no free time but can donate excess funds. Or, one can be
poor and have free time, so time does not truly reflect socioeconomic status (Brady et al.,
1995). Because education and income are correlated one can assume money separates
those who are actively engaged in the political process and education also increases one’s
civic skills. The underlying assumption for this paragraph’s framework is equal disburse-
ment of political interest across citizens. This paper shows that under natural disaster
conditions this assumption may not hold.
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This research Lijphart (1997); Vowels et al. (2017); Verba (1996); Brady et al. (1995)
shows that those from a lower socioeconomic status, i.e. minorities under natural disaster
conditions, vote significantly less than Whites in terms of total population percentage.
Minority groups also suffer the most from voter suppression laws by having less edu-
cation, family income, wealth, and language barriers under ceteris paribus conditions.
Consequently, these research questions has three assumptions. First, the assumption is
the majority demographic race will vote regardless of disasters or not, so all minority
races are compared to holding the white majority constant to the percentage of the total
population. Second, Whites do not suffer from voter suppression. Third, natural disasters
will have a statistical significance on voter turnout and fourth, different natural disaster
categories, e.g., climatological and meteorological, will vary the statistical significance
of minority voter turnout holding white voter turnout constant to the percentage of the
total population.
These research questions are important in the research of natural disaster studies
and furthers the research of Verba (1996); Lijphart (1997) and others. As Wuebbles
et al. (2017) and NOAA (2019) have noted, natural disasters interrupt lives with severe
consequences and these hypotheses address the issues natural disasters present in voting
behaviors. Answering these questions will further natural disaster research.
1.2 Theoretical approach
The methodology used will involve studying the impact of disasters on voters and their
ex ante and ex post participation in election cycles. This ex ante and ex post analysis
uses the assumption from Riker and Ordeshook (1968): a voting cost exists as shown in
the following equation.
R = PB − C +D (1)
The theoretical equation variables are defined as follows: R is equivalent to the individual
utility reward received from voting participation; P equals the citizen’s probability they
will vote with 0 ≤ P ≤ 1; B stands for the voter’s benefit in voting participation; the
cost of voting is C; and D represents a positive expected utility for participating in the
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election outcome. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) state what most voters consider are the
equation’s two key variables, C (cost) and D (positive expected utility). The cost, a
positive number, is subtracted from the product of probability and voter’s benefit.
However, does the ceteris paribus equation conditions exist for natural disaster voting
survivors? Intuitively one expects the greater the disaster will impact voter’s P ≈ 0. This
study uses Equation (1) and focuses on C and the order of utility preferences relationships.
Assume three disaster victims, Alpha, Beta, and Charlie, suffering under the most
devastating circumstance, i.e., loss of housing and income. Also assume, elections are
held soon after the disaster. The fictitious voter victims have three possible preferences:
voting in the election, or finding housing, or finding employment. A third assumption is
Alpha, Beta, and Charlie are rational actors and their choices are independent.





None of the the choices of Alpha, Beta, and Charlie, are wrong, they only express
the preferences of each of them. These choice orders provide varying degrees of utility
to each of the imaginary actors (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). Alpha’s voting equation below
illustrates this concept.
R = PB − C +D (2)
= 0B − C +D (3)
= D − C (4)
If Alpha has a zero probability of voting then equation (2) results into R = D − C
and Alpha will not vote because C = −1 assuming that D, the positive expected utility
for participating in the election outcome, has a positive value after subtracting C, the
cost of voting.
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Beta’s voting equation follows.
R = PB − C +D (5)
= 1B − 0 +D (6)
= B +D (7)
Beta will vote because the variables B = voters benefit, andD = positive expected utility
and positive coefficients. Beta’s cost for voting has a value of C = 0.
Charlie has a 50-50 chance of voting preferences thus the probability for Charlie,
P = 0.5.
R = PB − C +D (8)
R = 0.5B − C +D (9)
If B is halved the equation segment becomes 0.5B > −C, then Charlie votes and the
D = positive expected utility, because of a positive value is ignored. If 0.5B < −C
then Charlie will not vote. In this hypothetical example with a 0.5 probability, Charlie
may or may not vote. Ergo, Charlie is indifferent in his voting utility. This preference
by Charlie demonstrates the dilemma of disaster studies because a possibility exists the
disaster event and the type of loss Charlie experienced will show the order of the ordered
preference.
If Equation (1) C = 0, then R = PB + D and the utility of voting will depend
upon the probability of the individual preferences of the individual. Similarly, if C = 1,
then R = PB − (1) + D and any value of P (probability) results in a negative value
and the voter will not vote because C has a negative sign. This simple proof shows for
minorities, especially after a natural disaster event the probability of minority’s voting
are negative because of their socioeconomic status, language barriers, wealth, lacking
political information, and voting registration laws. Each of the minority groups lowers
the value of P in Equation (1) and the values between P and C diverge giving a negative
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value and thus creating a greater barrier after a disaster minority citizens must overcome
to vote.
From Section 1.2 and the succeeding mathematical proofs the cost of voting depends
upon the rational preferences of the fictional Alpha, Beta, and Charlie. The cost, C
however, is always negative. The value of R, the individual utility reward from voting,
will depend upon the negative C as determined by the individual preferences and the
disaster losses the citizen has suffered.
How does Section 1.2 and Equation (1) work with minority voters? Minority voters
have one of the three preferences after a disaster, housing, voting, and job, the same as
Alpha, Beta, and Charlie. They also have the same negative cost. When destruction
happens people will fight to survive the dramatic aftermath depending upon their ratio-
nal preference individualized to their circumstances. Minorities will react the same way
whether they are Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native, or Two or more races. One cannot as-
sume otherwise. The difference for minorities compared to Whites is their socioeconomic
status, language barriers, wealth, and education to overcome.
For citizens to vote the P (probability) and C (cost) have a direct negative relationship.
With minorities having disadvantages in lower socioeconomic status, language barriers,
and education, it equates P < C. To reverse the less than sign the probability must have
a larger value than the cost to overcome the PB−C portion of Equation (1) and provide
a positive value for a citizen to vote. However, 0 ≤ C ≤ P and C will always have a
negative sign. The other variables, R (individual utility reward), B (voter benefit for
civic participation), and D (positive expected utility for participation) in Equation (1)
are moot based on the preceding analysis. Why? If P < C then R becomes irrelevant,
there is no benefit in voting, and the positive expected utility of one’s candidate or party
winning has no value. Thus, the two variables P and C determine the values of the
remaining variables.
For minorities this negative cost, C in Equation (1) along with their preferences espe-
cially after a natural disaster, has a greater negative value because of their lower socioeco-
nomic status, language barriers, and education. These factors become more complicated
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if the minority lives as a disaster refugee, i.e., searching for housing and employment.
Because Asians have higher poverty rates than all Americans this causes one barrier to
enter political participation and potentially lowers the probability of Asians voting when
compared to Whites in the percentage of Whites in the total population (Xu, 2002).
Blacks too have similar issues and the cost of voting only intensifies this lack of civic
interest because of their perception of the federal government’s historical indifference and
lack of responsibility to their plight after natural disasters (Rivera and Miller, 2007).
Hispanics also suffer under natural disaster conditions but their heterogeneity provides
group variation and they do vote less than Whites (Antunes and Gaitz, 1975; DeSipio,
1998; Highton and Burris, 2002; Fraga, 2016). Natives vote at the same level as Hispanics
and Asians (Herrick et al., 2020).
Marginal costs need considered in the cost of voting as shown in Equation (1) Aldrich
(1993) shows how the marginal cost of voting will decrease turnout. These marginal
costs historically were increased voting registration laws, poll taxes, and residency re-
quirements. How different then do these costs vary from the simple model in Section 1.2?
If the cost of voting C is low then the benefits B will likely be low (Aldrich, 1993).
Voting then becomes a marginal decision and has low costs and low expected benefits.
However, in terms of a disaster, loss of housing and job, these low costs may skyrocket
especially for minorities. Because minorities may not reap any benefit from voting this
marginal cost, although not specifically identified in Equation (1), it may cost as little
as the discomfort of standing in line in the rain, using extra gas to travel to the polling
station, or having confronted life’s personal problems. Some voters may consider these
marginal costs expensive and thus not vote. The election race may constitute another
marginal cost because of the saliency of the type of candidate. Voters may place a greater
importance on the POTUS race compared to House or governor so the marginal cost may
lower. In a non-POTUS election year the marginal cost may be higher for those electoral
candidates.
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2 Natural disasters and voting
Abney and Hill (1966) provide one of the first studies regarding natural disasters and vot-
ing. Hurricane Betsy struck southeast Louisiana on 9 September 1965 bringing flooding,
destruction, and death. Betsy also was the first billion dollar damage natural disaster
with $1.2 billion damage costs in Louisiana, Florida with $1.39 million, Mississippi $80
million, and Alabama $500,000 in damages. Betsy caused a estimated total damage of
$1,433,800,000, in 1965 dollars (Sugg, 1966). Abney and Hill (1966) surveyed three small
“dry” precincts and two larger “wet” precincts with wet defined as those areas where peo-
ple were flooded out of their homes and dry as otherwise or no flooding in New Orleans.
Using a logit model it appeared natural disasters are not automatically detrimental to
the government in power.
Citizens may hold the government responsible after a natural disaster if in the voter’s
mind only the government can prevent the intensity of a natural catastrophe according
to the survey data and logit model results of Arceneaux and Stein (2006). This study,
Arceneaux and Stein (2006), was similar to Abney and Hill (1966) with the use of a
logit model. Ashworth et al. (2018) studied the question of voter irrationality when non-
political events outside their control effect electoral outcomes. They concluded natural
disaster impacts do not have a sufficient inference that cause voters to behave irrationally.
Healy and Malhotra (2009) shows voters reward the incumbent presidential party for
delivering disaster relief spending. However the results change if the incumbent did not
invest in disaster preparedness spending. This results in inconsistencies which distort
public officials incentives and leads to disaster preparedness underinvestment.
Flores and Smith (2012) using de Mesquita et al. (2005) selectorate theory, claim
in a large coalition of democratic systems the frequency of disasters has no effect on
protests and leader survival, yet if many people die more protests occur and leader survival
diminishes. In more autocratic small coalition systems, disasters place leader’s tenure at
risk because an election allows disgruntled citizens a punishing opportunity, even though
preventing a natural disaster is outside the purview of officials. Flores and Smith (2012)
used data from EM-DAT.
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Lasala-Blanco et al. (2017), using survey data, concluded no difference in the likeli-
hood to vote between those who had suffered greatly to those who suffered little after
Hurricane Sandy struck near Brigantine, New Jersey in the 2012 presidential election.
“The increase in the cost of voting . . . did not appear to be related to voting” or those in
the disaster areas did not appear to use their votes to express disapproval of federal re-
covery efforts (Lasala-Blanco et al., 2017). This study on the prima facie evidence seems
to support the voting calculus of Riker and Ordeshook (1968) concerning the costs and
benefits of voting which implies under the right natural disaster events voters believe D,
(see Equation (1), Page 6), motivates voters enough to ignore their circumstances and
vote.
The re-election of mayor Ray Nagin after Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans shows
a critical factor was the racial identity of voters who placed a greater responsibility on
the federal government for their failed assistance responses (Lay, 2009). Nagin was not
blamed for those failures and Lay (2009) clearly states Nagin’s re-election support was
“defined by race.” Elections following on the heels of natural disasters provide an excellent
test for retrospective voting and as Lay (2009) shows, race. Ergo, was the election about
Nagin or an informal referendum of the Bush administration’s bungling of the Katrina
catastrophe? Lasala-Blanco et al. (2017) and Lay (2009) seem to have differing conclu-
sions regarding the same type of disaster, hurricanes and retrospective voting regarding
the federal government’s response. Part of the problem is: How do governors respond
to the disaster and ask for federal help? Democrat Louisiana governor Kathleen Blanco,
during hurricane Katrina, was blamed for her unpreparedness and indecisiveness; how-
ever, Gasper and Reeves (2010) studied governors up for reelection during a disaster crisis
and found they behave opportunistically. They did not find evidence of partisanship as
governors had no issue asking for help, even in battleground states, from a president’s
opposing party. The Democrat Blanco asked for help from the Republican George W.
Bush administration and pointed out that Mississippi Republican governor Haley Bar-
bour received more federal aid, supporting the finding that the key is the motivations
of the president and governor (Gasper and Reeves, 2010). One study did find voters
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punish incumbents if tornados created economic damages, but interestingly, not for the
fatalities in the damaged county and surrounding counties (Healy and Malhotra, 2010).
Incumbents were punished if no government response occurred.
2.1 Flooding and hurricanes
Using voter data from the Louisiana Secretary of State’s Office that included individual
data on all registered voters in the New Orleans parish of 238,627 individuals and US
Census blockgroup information, Sinclair et al. (2011) found flooding on voter participation
was not linear. However, registered voters who experienced more than 6 feet of flooding
were more likely to participate in the election than those who experienced less flooding.
They concluded there is a complex relationship between participation and the costs and
benefits of turnout. This complexity appears in Equation (1).
Tropical storm Allison created massive flooding in Southeast Texas by raining for
almost five days straight and parts of Houston received nearly 37 inches of rain in June
2001. The resulting 500-year flood caused nearly $5 billion in damages with twenty-
two people losing their lives. Using survey data, Arceneaux and Stein (2006) studied the
accountability question, who do voters blame for flood preparedness and found preferences
for voting were determined by personal experiences and the public’s ability to bring those
choices to the appropriate elected officials. In this case study, the incumbent Houston
mayor Lee Brown survived re-election.
Czechoslovakia suffered catastrophic floods in 2002 and had local elections the same
year. Potluka and Slavikova (2010) hypothesized whether this disaster would change the
political representation in the flooded towns. The finding was no statistical significant
impact existed. Another flood study evaluated the counties of the Great Mississippi
Flood and the 1928 Presidential election which used a differences in differences model
and found the flood effects were substantial and negative which probably cost candidate
Herbert Hoover 10.8% points. Heersink et al. (2017) concluded the counties with the worst
flooding did not punish Hoover more but the counties with less damage did. This finding
contradicts the assumption of retrospection voting that voters look backward in assessing
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the incumbent’s performance. Another study shows that voters reward the observed aid
and the action but also punish the denying of help to both POTUS and governors and
the authors concluded this showed evidence for retrospective voting (Gasper and Reeves,
2011).
2.2 Earthquakes
Rissmann (2016) working paper tested an incumbent punishment hypothesis using a two
level hierarchical linear regression on the electoral outcomes in earthquake disaster areas
from 690 electoral districts in 16 Latin American countries for the 1980-2012 time period.
The data came from EM-DAT and the DesInventar Project which geo-references down to
municipality level. Rissmann (2016) found voters punish incumbents, after earthquake
disasters, when good quality institutions exist. In countries with poor quality institutions
incumbents do not receive punishment but are rewarded. Visconti (2018) found citizens
affected by catastrophes, especially earthquakes in Chile, seek to reduce the gap between
their living conditions before and after the disaster. This leads them to focus on welfare
and social policies. Consequently, they are more inclined to vote for parties or persons
associated with those measures because of a shift in priorities i.e., housing (Visconti,
2018). Under those conditions an incumbent may lose the election. This study used
fieldwork survey data.
Anbarci et al. (2005) has a model showing per capita income and inequality relate
to an earthquake’s actual death toll because of existing collective action problems. The
interconnectedness of per capita income and the level of inequality in the society causes
the rich to self-insure against future disasters leaving the poor to fend for themselves.
Within this theoretical paradigm, political-economic institutions have some responsibility
for earthquake deaths (Anbarci et al., 2005). Carlin et al. (2014a) argues natural disasters
may impact the political climate enough to add additional stresses to the political system
and may lead to a potential political change and public opinion. Earthquake shocks
impact on political change by causing voters to hold incumbents responsible for human
and physical earthquake damages (Habibur Rahman et al., 2017).
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2.3 Rain
Using 3,000 Spanish weather stations, rain and voting was studied by Artés (2014) to
determine the causal effect of voter turnout in Spanish general elections. Turnout has two
components; first, the weather, and second, economic conditions. Artés (2014) found the
rational choice theory of voting held because bad weather increased the costs of voting
and lowered the benefits of participation in the electoral process.
Rain had a negative impact on Norwegian municipal election turnout and reduces it
by 0.7 percentage points and hurts left wing parties but helps right wing and local parties
(Lind, 2014). Rain causes negative emotions and are a direct consequence on voter’s and
those negative feelings cause a less likely vote for change by 1.2 percentage points (Meier
et al., 2016).
The closest comparable study to this analysis was done by Gomez et al. (2007) who
also analyzed 3,114 counties in the continental United States and a time of 14 years, and
43,340 observations in an analysis of POTUS elections. The focus of the that study was
precipitation and the impact upon Republican voters. This paper differs by separating
the elections, House, Senate, POTUS, and governor, and uses a difference in difference
model because each election has a uniqueness, i.e., different candidates and issues.
2.4 Wildfires
McCoy and Walsh (2018) based their study on Tversky and Kahneman (1974) idea of
heuristics and their model drew inferences about the underlying changes in perceptions
about risk regarding wildfires. Households in high risk areas may have greater sensitivity
to information shocks regarding risk. Ramos and Sanz (2018) shows an accidental large
fire within 9 months of a local election is Spain increases up to 8 percentage points the
votes for incumbents. This is not true for regional or national elections nor for fires more
than 9 months from the election.
Natural disasters are a random natural phenomena impacting every living human.
Wuebbles et al. (2017) states a warming earth, according to scientific reports, will continue
to degrade and the historical norm for climate will change. This brief literature natural
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disaster review, although not addressing climate change, shows natural disasters impact
both negatively and positively voting behaviors and causes in varying degrees for all
involved as each of us are part of the 4 billion plus people on the planet.
2.5 Minority populations and voting
In general, research has shown minority groups tend to vote less than Whites and new
nationalized immigrants vote less because of language, acculturation, and socioeconomic
status. Within the minority groups are naturalized citizens and Bass and Casper (2001)
found that naturalized citizens who had lived in the same location for longer time periods,
were older, obtained more education, and had a higher income were more likely to vote.
Of course, such living conditions provide networks of social and political strength and
help shape the ideology of these new Americans. Larger racial groups empirically exert
a significant effect on voter turnout decisions, especially Latino and Asian American
individuals and this group effect interacts with the group economic status of the group and
overall county racial heterogeneity (Jang, 2009). These factors—socioeconomic status,
race, education, language, and demographics—are not new to political scientists who
study the inequality of representation and political participation. These elements favor
those with higher wealth and income, and better education versus those who are the less
advantaged citizens (Lijphart, 1997). Minority turnout is not higher in districts with
minority candidates, after accounting for the relative size of the ethnic group within a
district. Instead, Black and Latino citizens are more likely to vote in both primary and
general elections as their share of the population increases, regardless of the candidate’s
race.
Although this analysis does not consider naturalized citizens the underlying finding
of Bass and Casper (2001) runs through the following minority group literature.
2.5.1 Asian Americans
Xu (2002) writes that since 1990 the Asian and Pacific Islander population comprises
3.7% of the 2000 total American population. The largest of the American Asian groups
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are Chinese, Filipinos, Vietnamese, Koreans, Japanese, and Indians. One can easily see
that Asians are not a homogenous group although they are considered as such. Many of
these Americans live in California, New York, Hawaii, Texas, and Illinois. Surprisingly,
Xu (2002) states that Asian Americans “experience poverty rates slightly higher than
all Americans despite their higher median family incomes and educational attainment.”
According to Xu (2002) Asians Americans are more unlikely to register as Whites and
Blacks. With lower socioeconomic status and smaller total population percentage, Asian
Americans receive low returns on participation and like other minority groups opt out of
the electoral process. This study examines this under natural disaster conditions. Diaz
(2012) claims when Asians live in an area of more foreign born Asians and occupational
clustering, Asians are less likely to vote. When Asians have higher interracial marriage
rates it creates inclusiveness and increases political participation which leads to diverse
social networks. Yet, in metropolitan areas Asians vote at a higher rate than Whites
who are less likely to vote and this voting behavior occurs from the interconnection of
employment and family income (Diaz, 2012)
(Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999) replicated the finding from earlier studies that Asian-
Americans significantly participate less than Whites. However, Lien (2004) showed the
usual factors used to predict Asian turnout, education, age, length state of residence, and
election year, do not perform consistently across respective Asian groups. If anything,
studies should not view Asians as a homogeneous group but a heterogenous population
of many ethnic groups of varied backgrounds and cultures Lien (2004).
2.5.2 Black Americans
Blacks low political participation according to Milbrath and Goel (1977) comes from a low
socioeconomic status because of racial characteristics. Education and income significantly
affect Blacks participation rates (Harris, 1994);(Tate, 1994a); (Tate, 1991);(Dawson et al.,
1990). Racial group consciousness plays an important role in Black political participa-
tion and has a more important role than socioeconomic status although for some such
as African Caribbean, African Cuban, and Haitian Americans socioeconomics plays a
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greater influence (Austin et al., 2012). African Americans, African Caribbeans, African
Cubans and Haitian Americans do have the traditional factors—age, gender, generation
of citizenship, partisanship, and church attendance—and these have influence as well.
The history of natural disasters and Blacks is chronicled in Rivera and Miller (2007)
which details how natural disasters have caused Blacks to experience federal government
indifference, neglect, and lack of support after disasters.
2.5.3 Hispanic Americans
Hispanic’s socioeconomic and demographic variables, i.e., age, income, and education
explain Hispanic nonvoting (Antunes and Gaitz, 1975; DeSipio, 1998). Socioeconomic
status was also found to play a part when compared to Whites in the study by (Highton
and Burris, 2002). This study also found socioeconomic status that controlled the gap be-
tween Cuban Americans, Mexican Americans, and Puerto Ricans has largely disappeared.
Highton and Burris (2002) concluded that there does remain substantial intragroup vari-
ation among Hispanics. This natural disaster study does not differentiate between the
different Hispanic groups. Hispanic citizens vote the same as those in the same socioe-
conomic status but they do vote at a lower rate, 10% less than Whites in the midterm
elections (Cassel, 2002). Yet, Black and Hispanics are more likely to vote in both primary
and general elections as their percentage of the population increases (Fraga, 2016).
2.5.4 Native Americans
American Indians as a minority group in eastern Oklahoma exhibit political attitudes
similar to that of other US minority groups and is explained by similar socioeconomic
status (Min and Savage, 2012). Minorities act as the remaining source of Democratic
Party strength in the south and Eastern Oklahoma is unique because they play this role,
rather than Blacks or Hispanics (Min and Savage, 2012). Skopek and Garner (2014) uses
American National Election Survey data and found since 1990 Natives have become more
politically involved and are closing the gap between themselves and other groups.
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Because of the sordid history between the US federal and state governments one would
expect Native Americans to show no or little interest in the political process. In a new
study, it was found that Native Americans are no different in their involvement with
voting. They do vote less than African Americans and Whites, but at similar numbers
to Hispanics and Asians (Herrick et al., 2020). The study concluded, by looking at voter
turnout, that there was little to support a hypothesis that Natives were unique in their
voting behavior.
Although the 2010 Census shows Natives are 1.7% of the total US population in three
states, they are a large enough population to affect elections, e.g., Alaska has 19.5% and
Oklahoma has 12.9%, and New Mexico with 10.7% Native populations. Alaska is not
part of this study but Oklahoma and New Mexico are and both have recurring natural
disasters.
2.6 Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT)
The dataset, Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) is from the Centre for Research on
the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and supported by Université catholique de Lou-
vain in Brussels, Belgium. EM-DAT has twelve international collaborations and partner-
ships that partially includes the Max Planck Institute of Biogeochemistry, International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Secretariat for the International
Strategy for Disaster Reduction, United States Agency for International Development,
Asian Disaster Reduction Center, and the United Nations Development Programme. EM-
DAT is considered the international standard for national disaster data and this study
uses only EM-DAT data for the United States.
EM-DAT classifications are adapted and based on the “Peril Classification and Hazard
Glossary” from Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (2014). This programme started in
2008 with the backing from the International Council for Science, the International Social
Science Council and the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction.
Integrated Research on Disaster Risk strives to reduce the database gaps in disaster
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data collection by standardizing event classifications so database comparisons compare
(Integrated Research on Disaster Risk, 2014).
A challenge to classification is the association between perils and main events, because
they are not necessarily the same. IRDR recognizes that classification of disasters have
great importance and such classification happens on a case-by-case basis. Perils range
from ash fall, coastal erosion, flash flood, forest fire, heat wave and lightning. Disas-
ter classification moves in two directions: the most generalized (family) to the specific
(peril), and vice versa. Ergo, classifications are more pragmatic in nature than scien-
tific (Integrated Research on Disaster Risk, 2014). “Landslides following earthquakes or
volcanic eruptions fall into the geophysical main events category, whereas perils such as
debris or mud flows fall under hydrological hazards” (Integrated Research on Disaster
Risk, 2014). The IRDR quote shows the issues with classifications of disaster events
and demonstrates the similarities and differences between perils and main events and the
need for consideration of an individual disaster basis. For example, a snow avalanche
may have two different causes. If an earthquake triggers the event it becomes a mass
movement/geophysical event but if it starts from the snow’s weight and/or the snow’s
instability it becomes defined as a landslide/hydrological event (Integrated Research on
Disaster Risk, 2014).
EM-DAT categorizes natural disasters with six subgroups, following the categorization
schema of IRDR, however this study only focuses on four: climatological, geophysical,
hydrological, and meteorological. The two categories biological and extraterrestrial are
not included in this research. Only five biological and zero extraterrestrial events oc-
curred in this study’s timeframe of 1990-2016. Table 2, shows how EM-DAT categorizes
and defines a natural disaster for the four disaster subgroups. This study follows this
categorization and definition format throughout the analysis.
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Table 2: EM-DAT natural disaster group subgroups and definitions
Disaster
Subgroup Definition
Climatological A hazard caused by long-lived, meso- to macro-scale
atmospheric processes ranging from intra-seasonal to
multi-decadal climate variability.
Geophysical A hazard originating from solid earth. This term is
used interchangeably with the term geological hazard.
Hydrological A hazard caused by the occurrence, movement, and
distribution of surface and subsurface freshwater and
saltwater.
Meteorological A hazard caused by short-lived, micro- to meso-scale
extreme weather and atmospheric conditions that last
from minutes to days.
The definitional difference between climatological and meteorological is time. Cli-
matological measures years and meteorological has a short time duration lasting from
minutes to days. These EM-DAT definitions are the same as IRDR except IRDR uses
the heading “family” and EM-DAT uses “natural” as shown in the caption title of Table 2.
Table 3 and Table 4 illustrates the frequencies and years of climatological disasters.
Table 3: Climatological state frequency for 1990-2016
State STFIPS Freq. Percent
California 6 9 75.00
New Mexico 35 1 8.33
Texas 48 1 8.33
Washington 53 1 8.33
Total 12 100.00









Continued on next page
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Table 4 – continued from previous page
State STFIPS Freq.
Total 12 100.00
Figure 1: Climatological frequency for 1990-2016
Texas only has one climatological disaster in this study the same as NM, and WA.
California leads the nation in EM-DAT climatological disasters and the years 2002 and
2014 had the most frequent climatological events. These states, California, New Mexico,
Texas, and Washington, have an approximate mean of 20% of the population classified
as minority races. Because the higher minority population in these states disasters may
play a more key role in the minority voting turnout.
Table 5: Geophysical state frequency for 1990-2016
State STFIPS Freq. Percent
California 6 19 95.00
Hawaii 15 1 5.00
Total 20 100.00





Continued on next page
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Tables 5 to 6 shows only two states qualify for EM-DAT geophysical disasters, Cali-
fornia and Hawaii and 1990 had the most geophysical events according to EM-DAT for
the period 1990-2016. Hawaii does not appear in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Geophysical frequency for 1990-2016
Table 7: Hydrological state frequency for 1990-2016
State STFIPS Freq. Percent
Alabama 1 2 4.26
Arkansas 5 4 8.51
California 6 8 17.02
Georgia 13 6 12.77
Hawaii 15 1 2.13
Louisiana 22 1 2.13
Missouri 29 3 6.38
New Jersey 34 4 8.51
North Dakota 38 2 4.26
Ohio 39 7 14.89
Tennessee 47 1 2.13
Texas 48 8 17.02
Total 47 100.00
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EM-DAT hydrological disasters occurred the most in California and Texas and the
year with the highest count of events was 2006 according to Tables 7 to 8.
Figure 3: Hydrological frequency for 1990-2016
Table 9: Meteorological frequency and states for 1990-2016
State STFIPS Freq. Percent
Colorado 8 1 0.55
Florida 12 3 1.66
Georgia 13 1 0.55
Illinois 17 9 4.97
Indiana 18 17 9.39
Kansas 20 1 0.55
Kentucky 21 12 6.63
Continued on next page
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Table 9 – continued from previous page
State STFIPS Freq. Percent
Louisiana 22 5 2.76
Maryland 24 5 2.76
Mississippi 28 17 9.39
Missouri 29 8 4.42
Nebraska 31 1 0.55
Nevada 32 1 0.55
New York 36 12 6.63
North Carolina 37 2 1.10
Ohio 39 1 0.55
Oklahoma 40 45 24.86
Pennsylvania 42 9 4.97
Tennessee 47 9 4.97
Texas 48 4 2.21
West Virginia 54 17 9.39
Wisconsin 55 1 0.55
Total 181 100.00










Meteorological disasters are by far the most frequent event according to Tables 9 to 10
with Oklahoma having 24.86% of the nation’s meteorological events. 2002 had the most
EM-DAT recognized disasters.
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Figure 4: Meteorological frequency for 1990-2016
The purpose for investigating the descriptive subgroup statistics serves two purposes.
First, it allows one to grasp the statistical saliency of disaster research and the problems
associated with classification and categorization of events to have meaningful statistics.
Second, this investigation allows for a visual representation for yearly comparisons and
the exposure to historical natural disasters events.
2.7 What qualifies as a disaster?
According to EM-DATA, disasters must meet at least one of the criteria below to classify
as a disaster (catholique de Louvain, 2019).
• 10 or more people dead
• 100 or more people affected
• The declaration of a state of emergency
• A call for international assistance
The US government generally does not ask for international aid in times of disasters so
to qualify as an EM-DAT disaster the US must meet one of the first three benchmarks:
10 or more deaths, 100 or more affected, and the declaration of a state of emergency.
Notice, none of these requirements involve damage monetary amounts. This study uses
EM-DAT requirements but only of election years.
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The study of natural disasters has unique problems because of measurement and
classification issues. Yet, natural disasters impact every human on Earth either directly
or indirectly. This research attempts to further examine the impact of natural disasters
on the participation of citizens in the voluntary political process of voting.
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3 Empirical approach
This chapter discusses the methodology used for this study in explaining the method
used to determine the effect natural disasters has on voting behavior. Natural disas-
ters may cause citizens to punish leadership in elections if they believe the government
bears responsibility for their suffering (Abney and Hill, 1966; Achen and Bartels, 2017;
Arceneaux and Stein, 2006; Rissmann, 2016; Ashworth et al., 2018). Achen and Bartels
(2017) states, “The argument that natural disasters threaten rulers and regimes is not
new. However, the base of evidence on which it rests, while impressively broad histori-
cally, is also uncomfortably thin.” The studies listed above have mixed results from the
causation of natural disasters on election results. The theory these scholars use for the
studies is retrospective voting, or voters reward or punish by the incumbent’s impact on
the individual. Such voting behavior is not always viewed as rational behavior, however
to the individual voter the behavior has rationality.
The method in this study views voting behavior from a different perspective. Rather
than punishing or rewarding incumbents and candidates, voters may decide, especially
after a natural disaster, that a prohibitive cost of voting does not align with their pref-
erences and choose not to participate in the election process. Such behavior shows in a
lower total vote counts and a rational response to the individual voter’s preferences as
discussed in Section 1.2.
The above studies usually follow a similar methodology format: survey data (Arce-
neaux and Stein, 2006; Lasala-Blanco et al., 2017); polling data (Lay, 2009); voting
turnout (Sinclair et al., 2011); and regression analysis (Potluka and Slavikova, 2010).
Achen and Bartels (2004, 2017), Potluka and Slavikova (2010) and Gasper and Reeves
(2011) use ordinary least squares regression analyses using similar variables in their stud-
ies. This study will use regression analysis similar to those in Achen and Bartels (2004,
2017); duPont IV and Noy (2015); Cavallo and Noy (2009); Coffman and Noy (2012)
using differences in difference modeling, also known as synthetic controls.
The dependent variable yit represents the aggregate of voter participation at location
i at time t0 the time before the disaster. Ex ante natural disaster is represented as t−1.
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Mathematically the change in yit is calculated as:
Change in voting participation = ∆yit = yit=0 − yi,t−1 (10)
∆yit represents the change in the number of total voting participants i represents the
location, in this model individual counties (FIPS), and t is time. This change in the
number of total votes simulates the cost of voting after a disaster as in the discussion of
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) in Section 1.2.
The dependent variable y1 is defined as y1 = election total votespotential population . Potential population
(potpop) sums the total population for the following: Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, Native,
Two or more (self-identified people of Two or more races as defined by the US Census
Bureau), and Whites for the ages of 20 year-old and upwards. The US Census Bureau
age categories, relative to this study, must start at 20 years-old and older even though
the voting age in the US is 18. The Census has a category for 15-19 years-old and 20-24
years-old and the study could not determine who was age 18 and older in aggregate data.
From 10 we have the following linear equation model.
∆yit = y1 = α + βXit + γDISit + εi (11)
βX is the combination of independent variables related to the election, e.g., location,
year, and voter race. DIS represents the specific disaster variable related to disaster
subgroup is classified as a dummy variable where DIS equals one for a disaster in the
year of an election and zero otherwise. Each regression only considers one of the four
natural disaster subgroups and election races. Disaster categories are not mixed in the
equation and neither are elections. For example, disasters are classified separately so
combinations do not exist between the the four disaster subgroups creating an aggregate
regression. The same exists for elections even when the four elections—House, Senate,
gubernatorial, and POTUS—may occur in the same year. ε symbolize the errors. i
indexes locations and t years with y1 as the dependent variable In Equation (11) as
defined in Equation (10). This creates the following theoretical equation.
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Yit = β1 + β2(treati) + β3(timet) + ρ(treati × timet) + εit (12)
Equation (12), a Difference in Differences equation, is a tool used to estimate treat-
ment effects comparing the pre- and post-treatment differences in the outcome of a treat-
ment and a control group. In this study, the pre- and post-treatment differences test the
outcome of the impact natural disasters have upon racial minority groups voting turnout
by attempting to estimate the effect of a treatment or the disaster event’s as represented
by by the DV, Yit.
Equation (12) transforms into the following working model of Equation (13).
y1 = α+β1disaster+β2race+β3(disaster ×race)+β4election data+β5individual year+ε
(13)
Equation (13) becomes the foundational equation for this study.
3.1 Glossary
The variables used in the regression analysis are defined and listed in Table 11. This
glossary provides how the variable was created and the variable’s definition.
Table 11: Variable label and definition glossary
Variable Label Definition
y1 y1 = election total votespotential population dependent variable
asianper asianper = total Asianpotential population percent of Asian population in
county
blackper blackper = total Blackspotential population percentage of total Blacks in county
population
climate climatological disasters One of the four EM-DAT recog-
nized subgroup disasters
FIPS county FIPS Federal government five-digit num-
ber designation primarily for coun-
ties, Louisiana parishes, certain
metropolitan areas.
g1 created governor variable variable created to assist in the
analysis and prevent repeated time
issues in the regression
Continued on next page
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Table 11 – continued from previous page
Variable Label Definition
geo geophysical disasters One of the four EM-DAT recog-
nized subgroup disasters.
hispper hispper = total Hispanicspotential population percentage of total Hispanics in
county population
demper hdemper = hdemvotehtotal Democrat vote percent in total
county votes
margin vote margin = htotal X hmarper Democract vote margin in total
county votes
hydro hydrological disasters One of the four EM-DAT recog-
nized subgroup disasters.
STFIPS state FIPS Federal government two-digit des-
ignation for states and Washington
DC.
meteor meteorological disasters One of the four EM-DAT recog-
nized subgroup disasters
nativeper nativeper = total Native Americanspotential population percent of total Native Americans
in the county population
twoper twoper = total Two or more racespotential population percent total of people self-
identifying by the US Census
Bureau as Two or more races
potpop county potential total population potpop sums the total population
for the races in the study plus
Whites for the ages of 20 years and
older
Table 12 lists the most used prefixes for the variables in the dataset along with the
definition for the prefix. For example, gmargin represents the governor democrat vote
margin of the county (FIPS), and STFIPS stands for the state FIPS code.













3.2 Assumptions and explanations
This study makes the following assumptions and explanations.
• Alaska is not included in this study because the state has 19 boroughs and one
unorganized borough. The borough boundaries change with every census and this
changing boundary because of population changes for state legislature representa-
tion makes comparisons impossible. Because of the changing boundaries, and most
boroughs are sparsely populated and uninhabited it seemed prudent to drop Alaska
from the study.
• All of the races in the regression analysis was compared to Whites, the majority
race in the United States. The analysis assumed Whites would vote regardless of a
natural disaster or not. To eliminate collinearity issues in the analysis by using all
of the races and ethnicities the Whites were dropped.
• Each state has its own unique FIPS code assigned to it by the US government.
County FIPS codes are also unique but are combined with the state FIPS codes
resulting in a final code. Garfield county, CO has a different FIPS code, (08045),
than Garfield county, WA (53023) because Colorado and Washington have unique
state codes even though the county name is the same. To read a county FIPS code
the first two numbers are the state, Colorado is 08 and Washington 53, and the last
three numbers the county code, 045 for Garfield county, CO.
• The US Census Bureau changed the race and ethnicity data categorization in the
2000 census and Table 13 shows the coding used by the Census Bureau for 1990-99.






5 American Indian or Alaska Native male
Continued on next page
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Table 13 – continued from previous page
No. Definition
6 American Indian or Alaska Native female
7 Asian or Pacific Islander male
8 Asian or Pacific Islander female
Table 13 does not have a separate category for Hispanics. The US Bureau of the
Census (2003), instead of a separate category used a separate ethnic origin code of 1=
not Hispanic or Latino and 2=Hispanic or Latino. For example, a Black female citizen
would indicate 4 and either 1 or 2 for Hispanic ethnicity. For the 2000 census a change
was made in the categorizations of race and ethnicity US Bureau of the Census (2012).
Table 14 lists the new codes used by the Census Bureau. The 2000 census eliminated the
additional 1 or 2 for Hispanic ethnicity and had separate codes for the inclusion of race
and those with Hispanic ethnicity.
Table 14: 2000-16 US Census Race and Hispanic origin
Variable Description
TOT_POP Total population
TOT_MALE Total male population
TOT_FEMALE Total female population
WA_MALE White alone male population
WA_FEMALE White alone female population
BA_MALE Black or African American alone male population
BA_FEMALE Black or African American alone female population
IA_ MALE American Indian and Alaska Native alone male pop-ulation
IA_ FEMALE American Indian and Alaska Native alone female pop-ulation
AA_MALE Asian alone male population
AA_FEMALE Asian alone female population
NA_MALE Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alonemale population
NA_FEMALE Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone fe-male population
TOM_MALE Two or More Races male population
TOM_FEMALE Two or More Races female population
NH_MALE Not Hispanic male population
NH_FEMALE Not Hispanic female population
NHWA_MALE Not Hispanic, White alone male population
NHWA_FEMALE Not Hispanic, White alone female population
NHBA_MALE Not Hispanic, Black or African American alone malepopulation
Continued on next page
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Table 14 – continued from previous page
Variable Description
NHBA_FEMALE Not Hispanic, Black or African American alone femalepopulation
NHIA_MALE Not Hispanic, American Indian and Alaska Nativealone male population
NHIA_FEMALE Not Hispanic, American Indian and Alaska Nativealone female population
NHAA_MALE Not Hispanic, Asian alone male population
NHAA_FEMALE Not Hispanic, Asian alone female population
NHNA_MALE Not Hispanic, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Is-lander alone male population
NHNA_FEMALE Not Hispanic, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Is-lander alone female population
NHTOM_MALE Not Hispanic, Two or More Races male population
NHTOM_FEMALE Not Hispanic, Two or More Races female population
H_MALE Hispanic male population
H_FEMALE Hispanic female population
HWA_MALE Hispanic, White alone male population
HWA_FEMALE Hispanic, White alone female population
HBA_MALE Hispanic, Black or African American alone male pop-ulation
HBA_FEMALE Hispanic, Black or African American alone femalepopulation
HIA_MALE Hispanic, American Indian and Alaska Native alonemale population
HIA_FEMALE Hispanic, American Indian and Alaska Native alonefemale population
HAA_MALE Hispanic, Asian alone male population
HAA_FEMALE Hispanic, Asian alone female population
HNA_MALE Hispanic, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islanderalone male population
HNA_FEMALE Hispanic, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islanderalone female population
HTOM_MALE Hispanic, Two or More Races male population
HTOME_FEMALE Hispanic, Two or More Races female population
This study views Hispanics as equal to Asian, Black, Native American, Two or more
race, and White races. However, the Census Bureau considers Hispanics an ethnic group.
This study’s groupings of the races and Hispanics does not change the outcomes because
Hispanics are studied as a race as the literature in Section 2.5.3 shows. Thus, the re-
gression variables for race are Asian percentage (asianper), Black percentage (blackper),
Hispanic percentage (hispper), Native American percentage (nativeper), and Two or more
races (twoper). These percentages are the sum of the males and females of the partic-
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ular race and ethnicity in the FIPS (county). Dividing the total ethnic race group by
the potential population gives the FIPS percentage. The potential population, the DV
denominator, is defined in Table 11, Page 30.
3.3 Data
The data for this study comes from three primary sources. The US Census Bureau
provided the county population and race data. Type of disaster, year of event, and
location of the disaster comes from EM-DAT while Dave Leip’s Atlas of US Presidential
Elections records the voting results for the four elections used in this study. These three
data sets were merged into one data set for each type of election.
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3.4 Governor election analysis
All of the models in the governor analysis compare the election turnout to Whites as
these models focuses upon Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, Natives, and Two races or more as
categorized by the US Census Bureau.
Table 15 displays all of the disaster and governor elections for the years in the analysis.
Frequency is the number of counties in that year’s election. This study uses three models
per each disaster category with some variation from the models used by the House,
POTUS, and Senate elections. The major difference with the governor analysis is the use
of STFIPS instead of clustering FIPS and a dummy variable for the varying seasonality
of governor elections. In the other three elections—House, POTUS, and Senate—the
regression used the FIPS cluster option.
With governor races, clustering STFIPS created repeated time value problems. To
overcome this problem the governor regressions used the individual states (STFIPS) in
the regressions. Gubernatorial elections occur every year and the pattern that emerges
shows more readily in the percent column of Table 15 as 9.77, 1.21, 2.60, and 0.71. These
percentage numbers repeat every four years, within a hundredth of a point from year to
year. To compensate for this a dummy variable, g1, was created. Years 1990, 1994, 1998,
2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 had a code of g1=1. 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, and
2015 had the code of g1=2. g1=3 represents 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and
2016. 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, and 2013 are g1=4. Coding the g1 in this manner
allowed the regression to provide results however, g1 was dropped for collinearity leaving
only g2, g3, and g4.
Table 15: Governor election cycle
Year Freq Percent Cum g1
1990 2148 9.77 9.77 1
1991 266 1.21 10.98 2
1992 571 2.60 13.58 3
1993 156 0.71 14.29 4
1994 2148 9.77 24.07 1
1995 266 1.21 25.28 2
1996 566 2.58 27.85 3
Continued on next page
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Table 15 – continued from previous page
Freq Per Cum g1
1997 156 0.71 28.56 4
1998 2148 9.77 38.34 1
1999 266 1.21 39.55 2
2000 566 2.58 42.12 3
2001 155 0.71 42.83 4
2002 2149 9.78 52.60 1
2003 324 1.47 54.08 2
2004 566 2.58 56.65 3
2005 155 0.71 57.36 4
2006 2149 9.78 67.14 1
2007 266 1.21 68.35 2
2008 566 2.58 70.92 3
2009 155 0.71 71.63 4
2010 2178 9.91 81.54 1
2011 321 1.46 83.00 2
2012 566 2.58 85.58 3
2013 154 0.70 86.28 4
2014 2148 9.77 96.05 1
2015 266 1.21 97.26 2
2016 602 2.74 100.00 3
Total 21977 100.00
Models 1, 4, 7, and 10 use Equation (14). β1 is a disaster dummy variable coded
β1 = 1 if the disaster occurred and β1 = 0 otherwise. The purpose of Equation (14)
determines if disasters have any impact at all on the individual races and ethnicities and
is the most basic format. Equation (14) has an underlying assumption that disasters do
not affect minority voter turnout.
y1 = α + β1disaster + β2race + β3individual year + β4STFIPS + ε (14)
Models 2, 5, 8, and 11 follow the follow format of Equation (14) but includes an
interaction variable between the disaster and the races and tests the assumption that
natural disasters do impact the individual minority groups.
y1 = α+ β1disaster + β2race + β3(disaster X race) + β4(individual year) + β5STFIPS + ε
(15)
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Models 3, 6, 9, and 12 include the format of Equation (15) with the addition of the
election data and results in Equation (16). The election data variables are the margin
of winning vote percentage and the Democrat party percentage of the total votes. The
winning vote percentage does not differentiate between parties or candidates, just what
the winning percentage was of the total votes cast. The two reasons why it does not matter
if this study used the Democratic party or Republican party as independent variables:
First, because if both variables were in the regression one would have been dropped
because of collinearity and second, because the US has two major parties, Democrats
and Republicans, and a win or loss by one party is the inverse of the other at election
time.
y1 = α + β1disaster + β2election data + β3race + β4(disaster ×race)
+β5individual year + βSTFIPS + ε
(16)
All of the four major disasters are dummy variables and are coded 1 equals a disaster
and 0 equals otherwise or no disaster. The calculation for the DV is y1 = gtotal
pottot
where
gtotal represents the governor race total election votes and the denominator represents
the sum of the potential total voters in the county. All of the DVs follow the same
format with the only change in the numerator for each elected office total votes. The





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In all three climatological regressions models the climate variable is statistically significant
but when not interacted with racial groups, then climatological is negatively statistically
significant. With interaction with the racial groups climate becomes positive statistically
significant. Without an interaction between climate and ethnicity as in Model 1, each of
the five racial groups in this study vote relatively less than Whites in terms of the pop-
ulation percentage. This finding supports the assumption that Whites, as the majority
race in the US, will vote in the governor’s election regardless of a climate natural disaster
or not.
Model 1 suggests a climate disaster would impact a lower governor total vote assuming
voters possibly disagree with an incumbent governor’s climatological disaster policies.
This supports the work by Arceneaux and Stein (2006) who found if the voter thinks the
government could prevent the intensity of the catastrophe but Lasala-Blanco et al. (2017)
seems to contradict Arceneaux and Stein (2006) findings. Because the EM-DAT definition
for a climatological disaster specifies a “hazard caused by. . . atmospheric processes ranging
from intraseasonal to multi-decadal climate variability” this disaster category is of long-
duration and possibly the disaster has little to do with election turnout. Model 1 does
support the Lijphart (1997) hypothesis that minority groups do not vote when compared
to Whites.
In both models 2 and 3 the same pattern occurs. Both of these models have climato-
logical interaction with the races. Blacks tend to to vote statistically more than Whites
in terms of total population percentages in models 2 and 3, and Hispanics and Natives
statistically significantly tend to vote less than Whites in terms of total population per-
centage.
The election variables in model 3, margin of winning votes is not significant while
the governor’s Democratic percentage of votes is highly significant. This shows that
accounting for climate and interaction between climate and race and ethnicity there is
a positive affect in the increase of Democratic votes to the total percentage of governor
votes.
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The governor’s spatial analysis in Figure 5 shows on average which counties have
climatological events during a governor’s election year.
Figure 5: Governor average climatalogical frequency per FIPS
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3.4.2 Geophysical analysis
Figure 6: Governor average geophysical frequency per FIPS
The governor’s spatial analysis in Figure 6 shows on average which counties have
geographical events during a governor’s election year.
The geophysical variable is negatively statistically significant only in model 4, no in-
teraction with race. Without the interaction with geophysical, all races in this study
vote significantly less than Whites in terms of the population percentage. This finding
supports the assumption that Whites, as the majority race in the US, will vote in the
governor’s election regardless of a geophysical natural disaster or not and without inter-
action minorities will significantly vote less when compared to White voters in terms of
the total population percentage.
With geophysical interaction, models 5 and 6, all five race categories have statistical
significance with Asians and Natives having statistical significance and voting more in
terms of the White population percentage. With interaction Blacks, Hispanics, and Two
43
or more statistically vote less when compared to White voters in terms of the total
population percentage.
Why do Asians and Natives have a positive statistical significance after a geophysical
event and Blacks, Hispanics, and Two or more are less? Is this lack of voter participation
by Blacks, Hispanics, and Two or more the result of the higher voting costs after a
geophysical event for these groups? Two possible answers are the incumbent governor is
punished for lack of response to the disaster Rissmann (2016) or because of an economic
and geographical interpretation partly based on Anbarci et al. (2005),Visconti (2018),
and Rissmann (2016). Economics plays a part as rich citizens, based on per capita
income and inequality, have insurance for future disasters and the poor are left with
nothing. After an earthquake a change in individual preferences and priorities occur,
namely housing especially if the voter has no property insurance she probably tend to
not voting because of trying to secure housing. A possibility exists because of the location
of Native reservations which tend less to have geophysical disasters and thus allow for a
lower cost to voting leading to increasing the Native voter turnout. Minorities tend to
live in higher concentrated metropolitan areas and Asians vote at a higher rate according
to Diaz (2012). A conclusive answer to these questions are, however beyond the scope of
this study and would need further research as only supposition would provide an answer.
The election variables in model 6, margin of winning votes is not significant while
the governor’s Democratic percentage of votes is highly significant. This shows that
accounting for geophysical disasters and the interaction between geophysical and race
and ethnicity, there is a positive affect on the increase of Democratic votes compared to
the total governor votes.
3.4.3 Hydrological analysis
Hydrological disasters, e.g., flooding, are not statistically significant in model 7, but are
statistically significant in the interaction models 8 and 9. Without hydrological inter-
action all five races are statistically significant and vote less than Whites in terms of
the population percentage. This finding supports the assumption that Whites, as the
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majority race in the US, will vote in the governor’s election regardless of a hydrological
natural disaster or not.
With hydrological interaction in both models 8 and 9 only Hispanics and Natives vote
less when compared to the White voter population percentage. Perhaps, because of a
hydrological disaster it impacts the geographical location where Hispanics and Natives
tend to live. Such an assumption seems reasonable, that if their homes and jobs are
flooded the cost to vote is higher than securing housing and work however Sinclair et al.
(2011) noted those who experienced flooding less than 6’ of water tended not to vote.
The election variables in model 9, margin of winning votes is not significant while the
governor’s Democratic percentage of votes is highly significant. This shows that account-
ing for hydrological and the interaction between hydrological and race and ethnicity there
is a positive affect on the increase of Democratic votes compared to the total Governor
votes.
Figure 7: Governor average hydrological frequency per FIPS
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The governor’s spatial analysis in Figure 7 shows on average which counties have
hydrological events during a governor’s election year.
3.4.4 Meteorological
Figure 8: Governor average meteorological frequency per FIPS
The governor’s spatial analysis in Figure 8 shows on average which counties have
meteorological events during a governor’s election year.
The meteorological variable has no statistical significance in all three models, 10, 11,
and 12, with and without interaction with race. Without interaction with the meteo-
rological variable all five races vote statistically significantly less than Whites in terms
of the population percentage. This finding supports the assumption that Whites, as the
majority race in the US, will vote in the governor’s election regardless of a meteorological
natural disaster or not.
In the interaction between race and meteorological disasters, all five race categories
have statistical significance with only Two or more races voting statistically significantly
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more than Whites in terms of the population percentage. Meteorological disasters, by
EM-DAT definition, are “short-lived, micro-to mesoscale extreme weather. . . that last
from minutes to days.” Meteorological disaster examples are hurricanes, thunderstorms,
and tornadoes. These are the disasters that happen suddenly and annually. This study,
using the EM-DAT meteorological definition, can explain why the Asians, Hispanics,
Blacks, and Native percentages tend to vote less than Whites in terms of the population
percentage because quite possibly the cost of voting is much higher than securing housing
and jobs under meteorological disaster conditions. This study cannot explain why only
individuals who claim Two or more races would vote more in governor elections under
meteorological conditions than Whites in terms of the total population percentage.
The election variables in model 9, margin of winning votes is not significant while the
governor’s Democratic percentage of votes is highly significant. This shows that account-
ing for meteorological disasters and the interaction between meteorological disasters and
race there is a positive affect on the increase of Democratic votes compared to the total
Governor votes.
3.4.5 Governor residual analysis
The residual scatterplots, models 3, 6, 9, and 12, show a symmetric consistency in the
models with clustering less than 1 with one consistent outlier in all four disaster categories,
FIPS 48301 Loving county, TX in the year 1998. All other residuals in the four disaster
categories are less than 1. The reason for this residual outlier is an election data entry
error from the original data source. 48301 had a total population of 63 people, aged
twenty and upwards, yet the data records a governor vote total of 108. Because the DV,
y1 = governor total votepotential population , and the denominator includes the white population, the residual
becomes an outlier.
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Figure 9: Governor climatological residuals scatterplot
Figure 10: Governor geophysical residuals scatterplot
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Figure 11: Governor hydrological residuals scatterplot
Figure 12: Governor meteorological residuals scatterplot
3.4.6 Governor race conclusions
Without interaction between the natural disaster and race and ethnicity each of these
models in the most conservative form, models 1, 4, 7, and 10 show Asians, Blacks,
Hispanics, Natives, and Two or more races, vote statistically significantly less than Whites
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in terms of population percentage. This finding supports the disaster voting literature
regarding minority groups. One may possibly explain this in terms of voter suppression or
just the lack of interest by minorities in gubernatorial races. With the disaster interaction
this statistical significance changes. However, these four models show only Hispanics and
Natives consistently tend not to interact with the governor voting process in all four
disaster types. This study makes no assumption to why but just notes the statistical
significance.
In all four models—3, 6, 9, and 12—the percentage vote for Democrat governor candi-
dates are highly statistically significant. Because of the two party system in the US, one
can reasonably expect if Democrats receive a statistically significant higher percentage
number of votes, then similarly, Republican governors receive a statistically significant
lower percentage number of votes when one of these four EM-DAT disasters occur.
Figure 13: Governor average DV, y1
Figure 13 illustrates the average minority voter turnout overtime for FIPS having the
four natural disaster categories. Spatially, this map shows where minority races do not
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vote and many of these areas are where natural disasters occur in the years of a governor’s
election.
51
3.5 House election analysis
US House elections occur every two years for every House seat as mandated by the
Constitution. All of the models in the House analysis compare the election turnout to
Whites as these models focuses upon Asians, Blacks, Hispanic ethnicity, Natives, and
Two races or more as categorized by the US Census Bureau.
Table 17 displays all of the linear regression results of the disasters and House elections
for the years in the analysis. This study uses three models per each disaster category. β1
is a disaster dummy variable coded β1 = 1 if the disaster occurred and β1 = 0 otherwise
in each of the disaster categories. The calculation for the DV is y1 = htotal
pottot
where the
numerator htotal represents the House race total election votes and the denominator
represents the sum of the potential total voters in the county. All of the DVs follow the
same format with the only change in the numerator for each elected office total votes.
The denominator never changes. The House regression results follow in Table 17.
Models 1, 4, 7, and 10 use Equation (17). β1 is a disaster dummy variable coded
β1 = 1 if the disaster occurred and β1 = 0 otherwise. The purpose of Equation (17)
determines if disasters have any impact at all on the individual races and ethnicities and
is the most basic format. Equation (17) has an underlying assumption that disasters do
not affect minority voter turnout.
y1 = α + β1disaster + β2race + β3(individual year) + ε (17)
Models 2, 5, 8, and 11 follow the follow format of Equation (17) but includes an
interaction variable between the disaster and the races and tests the assumption that
natural disasters do impact the individual minority groups.
y1 = α + β!disaster + β2(disaster ×race) + β3(individual year) + ε (18)
Models 3, 6, 9, and 12 include the format of Equation (18) but adds two election
variables resulting in Equation (19).The election data variables are the margin of winning
vote percentage and the Democrat party percentage of the total votes. The winning vote
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percentage does not differentiate between parties or candidates, just what the winning
percentage was of the total votes cast. The two reasons why it does not matter if this study
used the Democratic party or Republican party as independent variables: First, because if
both variables were in the regression one would have been dropped because of collinearity
and second, because the US has two major parties, Democrats and Republicans, and a
win or loss by one party is the inverse of the other at election time.
y1 = α+β!disaster+β2(disaster ×race)+β3(individual year)+β4(election data)+ε (19)

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Climatological model 1 shows the climatological variable is negatively statistically sig-
nificant on a House election when not interacted with the races and ethnicities. Blacks,
Hispanics, Natives, and Two or more in model 1 are negatively statistically significant and
compared to Whites tend to vote less than the total population. Asians are statistically
significant and tend to vote more than Whites under non-interactive climatic conditions
when compared to Whites in the total population percentage.
In models 2 and 3 the climate is no longer statistically significant however, with this
interaction Asians vote statistically significantly more than Whites in terms of the White
population percentage and Hispanics vote statistically significantly less than Whites when
compared to the total population. Three possible suggestions for this exist. First, an
economic interpretation where income per capita may play a role, second, a general
malaise regarding House elections, i.e., no interest in the candidates, for Hispanics when
compared to Asians. Third, the voting cost for a House election is too high. These ideas
are open to further study. These findings supports the assumption that Whites, as the
majority race in the US, votes in House elections regardless of a climate disaster or not.
The election variables in model 3, margin of winning votes is not significant while the
House’s Democratic percentage of votes is highly significant. This shows that accounting
for climate and interaction between climate and race there is a positive affect on the
increase of Democratic votes to the total House votes.
The House spatial analysis in Figure 14 shows on average which counties have clima-
tological events during a House election year.
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Figure 14: House average climatological frequency per FIPS
3.5.2 Geophysical analysis
The House spatial analysis in Figure 15 shows on average which counties have geophysical
events during a House election year.
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Figure 15: House average geophysical frequency per FIPS
The geophysical variable has no significance in all three House election models, 4-6.
The same racial ethnic pattern appears with no interaction appears in model 4—Asians
vote statistically significantly more than Whites in terms of the total population percent-
age in all three models and the others Blacks, Hispanics, Natives, and Two or more vote
statistically significantly less than Whites in terms of the total population percentage.
With geophysical interaction, models 5 and 6, only the Hispanics interaction with
geophysical has statistical significance and the interaction results show Hispanics vote
relatively less than Whites in terms of the total population percentage. This study
suggests again that perhaps socioeconomic status, lack of interest, and voting cost in
a House election when a geophysical event occurs discourages Hispanics to significantly
tend to not vote when compared to Whites in terms of the total population percentage.
The election variables in model 6, margin of winning votes is not significant while the
House’s Democratic percentage of votes is highly significant. This shows that accounting
for geophysical and interaction between geophysical and race and ethnicity here is a
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positive affect on in the increase of Democratic votes to the total Governor votes when
compared to the House votes.
3.5.3 Hydrological analysis
The House spatial analysis in Figure 16 shows on average which counties have hydrological
events during a House election year.
Figure 16: House average hydrological frequency per FIPS
The hydrological variable, like the geophysical variable, has no statistical significance
across all three models, 7, 8 , and 9. With no interaction between hydrological and
race, all of the races and ethnicities are statistically significant. Asian’s vote relatively
more than Whites in terms of the total population percentage in model 7 and the other
races and ethnicities voting relatively less than Whites in terms of the total population
percentage.
Using model 8, hydrological interacting with race, shows Asians, Natives, and Two or
more groups have statistical significance with the tendency for Asians and Natives voting
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statistically significantly less than Whites in terms of the total population percentage.
Many Natives are located in isolated geographical areas and the possibility of flooded
roads prevents Natives from traveling to and from polling stations. Two or more groups
are more likely to vote in House elections relative to Whites in terms of the total pop-
ulation percentage. Hawaii and Oklahoma have the highest percentage of people who
identify as Two or more races. Hawaii has counties that range from 12.6% to 19.8% of
the potential population of the county identifying as Two or more races. However, when
a hydrological event occurs it happened only in Honolulu (15003 FIPS) and Kauai (15007
FIPS). Honolulu’s event occurred in 2004 and Kauai in 2006. The possibility exists that
the interest of Two or more in the House races in Hawaii happened because of local
politics and had nothing to do with the House election or the hydrological event.
The election variables in model 9, margin of winning votes is not significant while the
House’s Democratic percentage of votes is highly significant. This shows that accounting
for climate and interaction between climate and race and ethnicity there is a positive
affect in the increase of Democratic votes to the total House votes.
3.5.4 Meteorological
The House spatial analysis in Figure 17 shows on average which counties have meteoro-
logical events during a House election year.
60
Figure 17: House average meteorological frequency per FIPS
The meteorological variable only shows statistical significance when it does not inter-
act with race as in model 10. All of the same race statistical significant patterns as in the
climatological, geophysical, and hydrological outcomes appear. Only Asians tend to vote
significantly more than Whites in terms of the total population percentage. The other
race groups, Blacks, Hispanics, Natives, and Two or more tend not to vote with statistical
significance when compared to Whites in terms of the total population percentage.
With interaction between disaster and races, models 11 and 12 produce similar results.
Only Two or more tend to vote significantly more than Whites when compared to the total
population percentage. Asians, Hispanics, and Natives vote statistically significantly less
than Whites when compared to the total population percentage.
The election variables in model 12, margin of winning votes is not statistically signif-
icant while the House’s Democratic percentage of votes is highly significant. This shows
that accounting for meteorological disasters and interaction between meteorological and
race and ethnicity there is a positive affect on in the increase of Democratic votes to the
total House votes.
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3.5.5 House residual analysis
The residual scatterplots, models 3, 6, 9, and 12, show a symmetric consistency in the
models with clustering less than 1 with one consistent outlier in all four disaster categories,
48301 Loving county, TX in the years 1998 and 2000. All other FIPS residuals in the
four disaster categories are less than 1. The reason for this residual outlier is an election
data entry error from the original data source. 48301 had a total population of 63 and 52
people in the years 1998 and 2000, respectfully, aged twenty and upwards. The election
data records a House vote total of 94 and 134. Because the DV, y1 = house total votepotential population ,
and the denominator includes the white population, the residual becomes an outlier.
Figure 18: House climatological residuals scatterplot
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Figure 19: House geophysical residuals scatterplot
Figure 20: House hydrological residuals scatterplot
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Figure 21: House meteorological residuals scatterplot
3.5.6 House election conclusions
The research questions focus on two areas, natural disaster impact on minority voter
turnout and which disasters have statistical significance on minority voter turnout. The
House natural disaster regression results offer a mixed bag of voter turnout when com-
pared to Whites in terms of the total population when the disaster interacts with race
and ethnicity. Of the four disaster categories, Asians tend to vote more than Whites
when a climatological disaster occurs. Blacks are not statistically significant under any
of this study’s natural disaster categories with interaction. Hispanics tend to vote less
in climatological, geophysical, and meteorological disasters, yet more under hydrological
disaster conditions. Native Americans are statistically significant to tend to vote less than
Whites in terms of the total population percentage in hydrological and meteorological
disasters. Two or more voters when disaster interaction occurs they tend to vote statis-
tically more than Whites in terms of the total population percentage under hydrological
and meteorological disasters.
Natural disasters do impact minority voters but it depends on the minority group
and some of these consequences are statistically significant but only with regard to the
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minority impacted group. None of the four disaster categories statistically significantly
affect all—Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Two or more—equally or
statistically significantly under the same disaster. Thus, the research questions are only
partially answered under these models for House elections.
In all four models the House Democratic percentage of total House votes was statis-
tically significant.
Figure 22: House average DV, y1
Figure 22 illustrates the average minority voter turnout overtime for FIPS having the
four natural disaster categories. Spatially, this map shows where minority races do not
vote and many of these areas are where natural disasters occur in the years of a House
election.
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3.6 POTUS election analysis
POTUS elections occur every four years as mandated by the Constitution. All of the
models in the POTUS analysis compare the election turnout to Whites as these models
focuses upon Asians, Blacks, Hispanic ethnicity, Natives, and Two races or more as
categorized by the US Census Bureau.
Table 18 displays all of the linear regression results of the disasters and POTUS
elections for the years in the analysis. This study uses three models per each disaster
category. β1 is a disaster dummy variable coded β1 = 1 if the disaster occurred and β1 = 0
otherwise in each of the disaster categories. The calculation for the DV is y1 = ptotal
pottot
where
the numerator ptotal represents the POTUS race total election votes and the denominator
represents the sum of the potential total voters in the county. All of the DVs follow the
same format with the only change in the numerator for each POTUS total votes based
upon the FIPS. The denominator never changes. The POTUS regression results follow
in Table 18.
Models 1, 4, 7, and 10 use Equation (20). β1 is a disaster dummy variable coded
β1 = 1 if the disaster occurred and β1 = 0 otherwise. The purpose of Equation (20)
determines if disasters have any impact at all on the individual races and ethnicities and
is the most basic format. Equation (20) has an underlying assumption that disasters do
not affect minority voter turnout.
y1 = α + β1disaster + β2race + β3(individual year) + ε (20)
Models 2, 5, 8, and 11 follow the follow format of Equation (21) but includes an
interaction variable between the disaster and the races and tests the assumption that
natural disasters do impact the individual minority groups.
y1 = α + β!disaster + β2(disaster ×race) + β3(individual year) + ε (21)
Models 3, 6, 9, and 12 include the format of Equation (21) but adds two election
variables. The election data variables are the margin of winning vote percentage and
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the Democrat party percentage of the total votes. The winning vote percentage does
not differentiate between parties or candidates, just what the winning percentage was
of the total votes cast. The two reasons why it does not matter if this study used the
Democratic party or Republican party as independent variables: First, because if both
variables were in the regression one would have been dropped because of collinearity and
second, because the US has two major parties, Democrats and Republicans, and a win
or loss by one party is the inverse of the other at election time.
y1 = α+β!disaster+β2(disaster ×race)+β3(individual year)+β4(election data)+ε (22)













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The POTUS spatial analysis in Figure 23 shows on average which counties have clima-
tological events during a POTUS election year.
Figure 23: POTUS average climatological frequency per FIPS
In model 1, the base model with no interaction between climatological and race and
ethnicity, shows the climatological variable has negative statistical significance. With in-
teraction between climate and race in model 2, the climate variable has negative statistical
significance and in model 3 no significance.
Without climate interaction with race, model 1, all of the races and ethnicities are
statistically significant expect Blacks. Hispanics, Natives, and Two or more tend to
statistically significantly vote less in terms of the White population percentage of the
total vote. A possible explanations for no statistical significance for Blacks is general lack
of political interest because of the history between Blacks and the federal government,
voter suppression, ID laws, lack of voter registration with these leading to a higher cost
of voting. These same possibilities why Blacks do not vote may explain why Hispanics,
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Natives, and Two or more are statistically significant and tend to vote less in terms
of White population percentage of the total vote. However, these explanations do not
explain why Asians are statistically significant and tend to vote more in terms of White
population percentage of the total vote during climatic conditions without interactions.
With climate interaction, model 2, Natives are statistically significant and are inclined
to vote less terms of the White population percentage of the total vote with no election
variables. The other races and ethnic groups have no statistical significance. When
election variables are included in model 3, Blacks and Hispanics are statistically significant
and are inclined to vote less in terms of the White population percentage of the total
vote. Why the change in statistical significance without and with election variables from
model 2 to 3 for Natives, Blacks, and Hispanics? This study has no plausible explanation
why this anomaly happens.
The election variables in model 3, margin of winning votes, is statistically significant
when climatological disasters are interacted with race on the total POTUS vote. The
POTUS Democrat vote percentage, accounting for climate and the interaction for climate
and race has a statistically significant affect on the total POTUS vote percentage.
3.6.2 Geophysical analysis
The POTUS spatial analysis in Figure 24 shows on average which counties have geophys-
ical events during a POTUS election year.
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Figure 24: POTUS average geophysical frequency per FIPS
The geophysical variable only has statistical significance in model 6—geophysical in-
teraction with race and ethnicity and the inclusion of election variables showing that
geophysical disasters with election variables included indicate a statistically significant of
lower POTUS election turnout because of the disaster.
With no geophysical interaction, model 4, Blacks are the only race which has no sta-
tistical significance. All of the remaining race and ethnicities, Asians, Hispanics, Natives,
and Two or more, are statistically significant Asians are statistically significant and tend
to vote more in terms of the White population percentage of the total vote. Hispanics,
Natives, and Two or more are statistically significant less in terms of voting in POTUS
elections in terms of the White population percentage of the total vote during geophysical
conditions with no geophysical interaction. This follows the same pattern as model 1.
In model 5, with geophysical interaction, Asians are statistically significant and are
inclined to vote more in terms of the White population percentage of the total vote with
no election variables. Hispanics, with geophysical interaction, are statistically significant
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and tend to vote less in terms of the White population percentage of the total vote.
In model 6, when election variables are included in the model, Blacks and Asians are
statistically significant and are inclined to vote more in terms of the White population
percentage of the total vote. Hispanics, when election variables are included in the
model, are statistically significant and tend to vote less in terms of the White population
percentage of the total vote.
The election variables in model 6, POTUS margin of winning votes is statistically
significant when geological disasters are interacted with race on the total POTUS vote.
The POTUS Democrat vote percentage, accounting for climate and the interaction for
geophysical and race has a statistically significant affect on the total POTUS vote per-
centage.
3.6.3 Hydrological analysis
The POTUS spatial analysis in Figure 25 shows on average which counties have hydro-
logical events during a POTUS election year.
Figure 25: POTUS average hydrological frequency per FIPS
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Hydrological disasters are not significant across all three models 7-9, suggesting PO-
TUS election total votes are less in terms hydrological events. Blacks are the only race
without statistical significance. Of the remaining races, in model 7, only Asians have
statistical significance in voting compared to the White percentage of the total vote. The
other races, Hispanics, Native, and Two-per with no interaction with hydrological vote
significantly less than Whites in terms of the population percentage. This follows the
same no interaction pattern found in models 1 and 4.
Models 8 and 9 have similar patterns, with interaction between hydrological and race,
Asians and Natives are statistically significant and tend to vote less in terms of the
White population percentage of the total vote. Two or more when interacting with the
hydrological variable, with and without the election variables, tend to vote more in terms
of the White population percentage of the total vote.
The election variables in model 9, margin of winning votes, is statistically significant
when hydrological disasters are interacted with race on the total POTUS vote. The
POTUS Democrat vote percentage, accounting for hydrological disasters and the inter-
action for hydrological and race has a statistically significant affect on the total POTUS
Democrat vote percentage.
3.6.4 Meteorological
The POTUS spatial analysis in Figure 26 shows on average which counties have meteo-
rological events during a POTUS election year.
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Figure 26: POTUS average meteorological frequency per FIPS
The meteorological variable has statistical significance only when no interaction with
race occurs as in Model 10. When interacted with race or interaction with race and the
inclusion of election variables, meteorological has no statistical significance.
With no interaction with meteorological, model 10, only Asians have a statistical
significance and are inclined to vote more than Whites in terms of the population per-
centage. Blacks have no statistical significance with no interaction and the remaining
races, Hispanic, Natives, and Two or more, are statistically significant and are inclined
to vote less than Whites in terms of the total population. Again, this follows the same
pattern for POTUS elections across models 1, 4, and 7.
A similar pattern occurs in models 11 and 12, race with interaction. Asians, Hispanics,
and Natives are statistically significant and tend to vote less than Whites in terms of the
total population. Two or more are statistically significant and are inclined to vote more
than Whites in terms of the total population.
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The election variables in model 12, margin of winning votes, is statistically significant
when meteorological disasters interact with race on the total POTUS vote. The POTUS
Democrat vote percentage, accounting for meteorological and the interaction for meteo-
rological and race has a statistically significant affect on the total POTUS Democrat vote
percentage when compared to the total POTUS vote percentage.
3.6.5 POTUS residual analysis
The residual scatterplots, models 3, 6, 9, and 12, show a symmetric consistency in the
models with clustering less than 1 with one consistent outlier in all four disaster categories,
48301 Loving county, TX in the years 2000 and 2004. All other FIPS residuals in the
four disaster categories are less than 1. The reason for this residual outlier is an election
data entry error from the original data source. 48301 had a total population of 52 and 45
people in the years 2000 and 2004, respectfully, aged twenty and upwards. The election
data records a POTUS vote total of 156 and 80. Because the DV, y1 = potus total votepotential population ,
and the denominator includes the white population, the residual becomes an outlier.
Figure 27: POTUS climatological residuals scatterplot
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Figure 28: POTUS geophysical residuals scatterplot
Figure 29: POTUS hydrological residuals scatterplot
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Figure 30: POTUS meteorological residuals scatterplot
3.6.6 POTUS election conclusions
All four disasters—climatological, geophysical, hydrological, and meteorological—report
similar results. Asians consistently vote more and Hispanics, Natives, and Two or more
routinely vote less.
With interaction between the disasters and the Asians, geophysical interaction results
in Asians vote more in terms of Whites, but under hydrological and meteorological cir-
cumstances Asians statistically tend to vote less in terms of the White population of the
total vote. In three events —climatological, geophysical, and meteorological —Hispanics
are statistically significant and to tend to vote less than Whites in terms of the total
population. Natives are statistically significant in tending to vote less than Whites in
terms of the total population when living under hydrological and meteorological con-
ditions with interaction. Two or more races are statistically significantly tend to vote
more than Whites in terms of the total population when living under hydrological and
meteorological disasters.
Natural disasters do impact minority voters but it depends on the minority group
and some of these consequences are statistically significant but only with regard to the
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minority impacted group. None of the four disaster categories are statistically significant
and affect all—Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Two or more—in equal
or statistically significance under the same disaster. Thus, the research questions are only
partially answered under these models for POTUS elections.
Figure 31: POTUS average DV, y1
Figure 31 illustrates the average minority voter turnout overtime for FIPS having the
four natural disaster categories. Spatially, this map shows where minority races do not
vote and many of these areas are where natural disasters occur in the years of a POTUS
election.
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3.7 Senate election analysis
Senate elections occur every two years with 1
3
of the Senate up for election as mandated by
the Constitution. All of the models in the Senate analysis compare the election turnout
to Whites as these models focuses upon Asians, Blacks, Hispanic ethnicity, Natives, and
Two races or more as categorized by the US Census Bureau.
Table 19 displays all of the linear regression results of the disasters and Senate elections
for the years in the analysis. This study uses three models per each disaster category. β1
is a disaster dummy variable coded β1 = 1 if the disaster occurred and β1 = 0 otherwise
in each of the disaster categories. The calculation for the DV is y1 = stotal
pottot
where the
numerator stotal represents the Senate race total election votes and the denominator
represents the sum of the potential total voters in the county. All of the DVs follow the
same format with the only change in the numerator for each elected office total votes.
The denominator never changes. The Senate regression results follow in Table 19.
Models 1, 4, 7, and 10 use Equation (23). β1 is a disaster dummy variable coded
β1 = 1 if the disaster occurred and β1 = 0 otherwise. The purpose of Equation (23)
determines if disasters have any impact at all on the individual races and ethnicities and
is the most basic format. Equation (23) has an underlying assumption that disasters do
not affect minority voter turnout.
y1 = α + β1disaster + β2race + β3(individual year) + ε (23)
Models 2, 5, 8, and 11 follow the follow format of Equation (23) but includes an
interaction variable between the disaster and the races and tests the assumption that
natural disasters do impact the individual minority groups.
y1 = α + β!disaster + β2(disaster ×race) + β3(individual year) + ε (24)
Models 3, 6, 9, and 12 include the format of Equation (24) but adds two election
variables resulting in Equation (25). The election data variables are the margin of winning
vote percentage and the Democrat party percentage of the total votes. The winning vote
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percentage does not differentiate between parties or candidates, just what the winning
percentage was of the total votes cast. The two reasons why it does not matter if this study
used the Democratic party or Republican party as independent variables: First, because if
both variables were in the regression one would have been dropped because of collinearity
and second, because the US has two major parties, Democrats and Republicans, and a
win or loss by one party is the inverse of the other at election time.
y1 = α+β!disaster+β2(disaster ×race)+β3(individual year)+β4(election data)+ε (25)





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 32: Senate average climatological frequency per FIPS
Figure 32 shows on average which counties have climatological events during a Senate
election year.
In model 1, the climatological variable is statistically significant with a negative sign
indicating under climatological conditions without interaction minorities will vote less.
Asians without interaction with the disaster statistically significantly vote more when
compared to Whites in terms of the total population in all four disaster models, 1, 4, 7,
and 10.
Each of the races and ethnicities, with no interaction in model 1, are statistically sig-
nificant with Blacks the only exception. Without interaction Asians tend to statistically
significantly vote more in terms of population percentage than Whites and Hispanics, Na-
tives, and Two-per are statistically significant in voting less in terms of total population
percentage than Whites.
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With interaction between climate and race, models 2 and 3, show similar results.
Climatological disasters are statistically significant with a disaster interaction between
Asians, Hispanics, and Two or more. Asians are statistically significant and tend to
vote more in terms of total population than Whites. Hispanics and Two or more are
statistically significant and tend to vote less in terms of White population percentage of
the total vote.
The election variables in model 3, margin of winning votes, are statistically significant
when climatological disasters are interacted with race on the total Senate vote. The Sen-
ate Democrat vote percentage, accounting for climatological disasters and the interaction
for climatological disasters and race and ethnicity has a statistically significant affect on
the total Senate vote percentage.
3.7.2 Geophysical analysis
Figure 33: Senate average geophysical frequency per FIPS
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Figure 33 shows on average which counties have geophysical events during a Senate
election year.
The geophysical variable has no significance in model 4, no interaction with the races.
In model 5 the geophysical variable has statistical significance when interacting with race
but no significance when election variables are included in model 6.
All of the race variables in model 4 are statistically significant and follow the same
pattern as model 1. Asians tend to vote more that Whites in terms of total population.
Hispanics, Natives and Two or more are statistically significant and tend to vote less than
Whites in terms of total population.
In models 5 and 6, interaction with races, the geophysical variable is statistically
significant and has positive impact on the Senate total vote only in model 5. In model 5,
the race interaction with the geophysical variable has all five race groups as statistically
significant. Asians and Natives tend to vote more than Whites in terms of the total
population and Blacks, Hispanics and Two or more tend to vote less with statistical
significance. This is the only model of the twelve Senate models that Blacks have any
statistical significance. Model 6 follows the same race results pattern except for Blacks
who are not statistically significant.
The election variables in model 6, margin of winning votes, is statistically significant
when geological disasters are interacted with race on the total Senate vote. The Senate
Democrat vote percentage, accounting for climate and the interaction for climate and
race has a statistical significant affect on the total Senate vote percentage.
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3.7.3 Hydrological analysis
Figure 34: Senate average hydrological frequency per FIPS
Figure 34 shows on average which counties have hydrological events during a Senate
election year.
Hydrological disasters are significant across all three models 7-9 implying hydrological
disasters are statistically significant with minority voters causing them to tend to vote
more than Whites in terms of the total population. Without an interaction, in model 7,
Blacks are the only race and ethnicity without statistical significance. Of the remaining
races, only Asians have more statistical significance in voting compared to the White
percentage of the total vote. The other races, Hispanics, Native, and Two-per with no
interaction with the hydrological variable, vote significantly less than Whites in terms of
the population percentage. This pattern follows models 1 and 4.
With interaction between hydrological and race and ethnicity in model 8, only His-
panics and Natives are statistically significant and tend to vote less in terms of the White
population percentage of the total vote. When including the election variables in model 9
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Natives are statistically significant and tend to vote less in terms of the white population
percentage the total vote.
The election variables in model 9, margin of winning votes, is statistically significant
when climatological disasters are interacted with race and ethnicity on the total Senate
vote. The Senate Democrat vote percentage, accounting for hydrological interaction with
race and ethnicity has a statistically significant affect on the total Senate Democrat vote
percentage.
3.7.4 Meteorological
Figure 35: Senate average meteorological frequency per FIPS
Figure 35 shows on average which counties have meteorological events during a Senate
election year.
The meteorological variable has statistical significance only when no interaction with
race occurs as in model 10. When interacted with race and the inclusion of election
variables meteor has no statistical significance in models 11 and 12.
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The pattern for race participation in elections have similarities in all three models
10, 11, and 12. With no interaction meteorological disasters Asians have a statistical
significance and are inclined to vote more than Whites in terms of the total population
percentage. Hispanic, Natives, and Two or more are statistically significant and with me-
teorological interaction vote less than Whites in terms of the total population percentage.
Blacks have no statistical significance in all three models.
In models 11 and 12, meteorological interacted with race, Asians, Hispanics, and Na-
tives are statistically significant and vote less than Whites in terms of the total population
percentage. Two or more people are statistically significant and tend to vote more than
Whites in terms of the total population percentage.
The election variables in model 12, margin of winning votes, is statistically significant
when meteorological disasters interact with race on the total Senate vote. The Senate
Democrat vote percentage, accounting for meteor and the interaction for meteor and race
has a statistically significant affect on the total Senate Democrat vote percentage.
3.7.5 Senate residual analysis
The residual scatterplots, models 3, 6, 9, and 12, show a symmetric consistency in the
models with clustering less than 1 with one consistent outlier in all four disaster categories,
48301 Loving county, TX in the year 2000. All other FIPS residuals in the four disaster
categories are less than 1. The reason for this residual outlier is an election data entry
error from the original data source. 48301 had a total population of 52 in the years 2000
aged twenty and upwards. The election data records a Senate vote total of 140. Because
the DV, y1 = senate total votepotential population , and the denominator includes the white population, the
residual becomes an outlier.
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Figure 36: Senate climatological residuals scatterplot
Figure 37: Senate geophysical residuals scatterplot
x
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Figure 38: Senate hydrological residuals scatterplot
Figure 39: Senate meteorological residuals scatterplot
3.7.6 Senate election conclusions
In the Senate election regression results a few races are fairly consistent in terms of the
disasters. Hispanics are consistent in voting less than Whites in terms of the total pop-
ulation across all the models except for model 9, disaster interaction without election
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variables. Two or more have mixed results with voting less in climatological and geo-
physical disasters and voting more in meteorological disasters. Asians are consistent in
voting statistically more than Whites in terms of total population under climatological
and geophysical models, but disappear under hydrological disasters with interaction in
both models 8 and 9. Asians are statistically significant in voting less when compared to
Whites when interacted with meteor with and without election variables.
Natural disasters do impact minority voters but it depends on the minority group
and some of these consequences are statistically significant but only with regard to the
minority impacted group. None of the four disaster categories statistically significantly
affect all—Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Two or more—in equal or
statistically significance under the same disaster.
Figure 40: Senate average DV, y1
Figure 40 illustrates the average minority voter turnout overtime for FIPS having the
four natural disaster categories. Spatially, this map shows where minority races do not
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vote and many of these areas are where natural disasters occur in the years of a Senate
election.
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4 Discussion and conclusions
This study attempts to answer the following research questions.
1. Which natural disasters have a statistically significant effect on minority voter
turnout?
2. Which natural disasters have a statistical significance upon the four major US
elections, House, Senate, POTUS, and governor?
Using the results from this analysis the answer to the first question has mixed re-
sults. Natural disasters do have statistical significance on minority voter turnout but it
depends on the types of disaster, election, and minority group. This suggests in terms of
the disasters that time appears as an exogenous factor and the EM-DAT definition for
a climatological disaster shows this data dilemma. A climatological disaster is a “hazard
caused by long-lived, meso- to macro-scale atmospheric processes ranging from intra-
seasonal to multi-decadal climate variability,” Table 2 Page 21. An extended timeline
causes the climatological disaster because the start of a climate disaster may occur in t0
and may last till t5 where t represents years. EM-DAT only registers the climatological
disaster at the end of the time and not the recurrence of the disaster every year from t0
to t5 but only in t5. This recording over time is not reflected in the regressions because
of the lack of information in the EM-DAT data set. Climatological disasters thus have
“fuzzy” starting and ending timelines along with frequencies. All other disasters have
a defined starting and ending point and without this time measurement, climatological
events make their regression results the most difficult to interpret and for reporting gov-
ernment officials. This study shows only 12 climatological disaster for the time period,
1990-2016. This makes for a very small sample size in terms of climatological frequencies
and the number of both FIPS and elections.
In terms of elections and races climatological disasters only figured in Asians and
House, POTUS, and Senate elections, Blacks in Governor and POTUS elections, His-
panics in all four elections, Natives in Governor and POTUS elections, and Two or more
in Senate elections. Climatological events appears in Blacks, Hispanics, and Natives in
governor elections. Geophysical events impacts Asian voters in House, POTUS, and Sen-
ate elections, Blacks in Governor, POTUS, and Senate elections, Hispanics in all four
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elections, Natives in governor and Senate elections, and Two or more races in Governor
and Senate elections.
The model does not explain how minorities living together in a location experiencing
climatological disasters have such a difference in voting behavior. The disaster includes
everyone so a possible explanation must come from Equation (1) Page 6 the C variable
or the cost of voting for a particular minority group.
For example, Natives with climatological interaction vote significantly less compared
to Whites in terms of the potential population percentage in a governor’s and POTUS
election. However, they have no significance in a House or Senate election and House
election which run concurrently with POTUS elections and oftentimes a Senate election.
This study cannot address why these election differences except to note they occur.
Geophysical earthquakes have a starting and ending time and date so everyone knows
when the disaster occurs. Scientists measure the intensity of earthquakes and their fre-
quency. Hydrological and meteorological events follow this same pattern as geophysical
disasters. Because of this “quietness” by climatological disasters, many minority voters
are not directly impacted by the “quietness.” Geophysical, hydrological, and meteoro-
logical disasters are “noisy,” short-term, and attracts more attention both in terms of
individual lives and news media. Because of the “noisiness” of the greater impact upon
individual voters this study shows the mixed results among the minority groups.
Hydrological events, i.e., flooding, are the result of some occurrence that affect surface
or subsurface water. At the state level governors have some policy impact in terms of
decisions. Of the two, climatological and hydrological, the one that affects voters more
directly are hydrological disasters, i.e., flooding. In fact, many floods are known they
are coming downstream providing citizens with some time to prepare. Governors may
enlist the aid of the National Guard to help with rescue and sandbagging to prevent
further flooding. Because climatological disasters, i.e., drought, are beyond the control of
a governor, climatological disasters may not have salience and other state political issues
may have more impact than the disaster in an election. This study cannot answer if such
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an assumption has validity, no matter how plausible. The other elections are federal so
the policy decision impacting voters are more national than local.
Of the 48 regressions Asians are affected in 1
4
of the regressions. Only only one House
hydrological disasters has an anomaly, model 8 without the election variables, Asians are
statistically significant but with election variables are not statistically significant. Why
this peculiarity happens the models cannot explain. In all the other 11 elections, both the
models without election variables and with election variables, the Asian minorities are
statistically significant. Asians and Hispanics are the racial groups that have the most
statistical significance within these model’s frameworks.
Blacks only have statistical significance in 6 of the 48 regressions for Black voters:
governor and climatological, geophysical and meteorological with and without election
variables, POTUS and climatological and geophysical both with election variables, and
Senate and geophysical without election variables. Why Blacks have this statistically
significant pattern of with and without election variables seems an oddity. There are
some possible answers for the lack of Black statistical significance regarding Black voter
turnout in the majority of these sampled elections with a lack of political engagement
by Black voters for House and Senate candidates so the disaster does not matter. This
disengagement may come from no interest in and from the candidates or lack of voter
information. Yet, that does not explain why Blacks would engage with POTUS and
governor elections. Thus, natural disasters do affect Black election turnout but depends
on the type of disaster and election.
The US Census Bureau does not consider Hispanics as a racial group but an ethnic
group. However, this study considers Hispanics as a race. Hispanics are statistically
significant in nearly every disaster category and election with the exception of POTUS
elections without election variables in climatological disasters without election variables
and hydrological disasters, Senate elections with a hydrological disaster and no election
variables. In 15 of the 48 regressions, 14 regressions show statistical significance of Hispan-
ics tending to vote less than Whites in terms of the total population. The only exception
is House elections with a hydrological disaster Hispanics are statistically significantly and
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tend to vote more than Whites in terms of population percentage. This positive statisti-
cal significance appears in the model 8 without the election variables. This study cannot
explain why hydrological disasters would prompt such behavior.
Governor and POTUS elections with climatological disasters, Natives vote statistically
significantly less with and without election variables and less without election variables
in POTUS elections. With geophysical disasters Natives tend to vote statistically signifi-
cantly more than Whites in total population percentage in Senate and governor elections.
In all four elections involving hydrological and meteorological disasters, Natives tend to
vote statistically significantly less than Whites in total population percentage. This study
cannot explain why hydrological and meteorological disasters prompt such behavior. An
increase in voting under geophysical disasters, may have a causation with location of the
Native reservation location not near an earthquake fault line.
Two or more race voters tend to statistically and significantly vote more than Whites
in terms of total population in meteorological events with and without election variables
in all four elections. This begs the question, why do Two or more race voters have more
statistical significance under meteorological disasters in all four types of elections? These
are the only citizens who consistently vote statistically more than Whites in terms of total
population in each of these four elections. This voting behavior diametrically opposes
the behavior of Asians, Hispanics, and Natives for the same election and meteorological
disaster. Why does this behavior not carry over to the the other three disaster categories?
This study shows that natural disasters do have an influence upon all four elections
but the impact varies with type and the minority group. Minorities are not homogeneous
groups thus in voting behavior to make a broad conclusion that covers all minority groups
has no possibility of statistical significance with these models.
This study does not consider how redistricting House districts may impact the mi-
nority voter and natural disasters. Every ten years the House district boundaries are
redrawn to represent the latest census count. This redistricting affects all voters but
may, depending on the state, party controlling the state legislature, whether or not the
state has a non-partisan electoral commission drawing the district boundary maps, im-
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pact minorities in greater or lesser numbers. This becomes an exogenous factor that may
have an impact on the model’s regression analysis.
Many of these elections overlap, e.g., House, POTUS, and 1
3
of the Senate. Governors
have a different election cycle that depends upon the state. This study separated each of
these elections because of conflicts with duplicate panel data disasters. Some trends do
though appear in the data results. House, POTUS, Senate, and governor elections with
meteorological disaster interactions and added election variables, show the same statistical
significance: Asians, Hispanics, and Natives tend to vote less than Whites in terms of total
population percentage and Two or more races tend to vote more than Whites in terms
of total population. Only one exception in the above statement concerns Blacks who
vote statistically significantly less than Whites in terms of total population percentage in
governor elections with meteorological disasters and added election variables.
Meteorological disasters may have the strongest evidence for answering the research
questions of this study. One explanation for meteorological disasters is EM-DAT require-
ments for a disaster at least one of the following: 10 or more dead, 100 or more people
affected, a declaration of a state of emergency (catholique de Louvain, 2019). Meteoro-
logical disasters include extra-tropical (Nor’easter), tropical (hurricanes), and convective
storms (localized thunderstorms (with heavy rain and/or hail, lightning, high winds,
tornadoes) to meso-scale, multi-day events. Under this criteria and types of storms, me-
teorological disasters have the most frequency and impact the greatest number of people
causing the most damage. It seems reasonable to expect meteorological disasters have
more affect on elections because of the number of affected people.
The second most frequent disaster are hydrological disasters which have the second
most frequency to meteorological disasters. Within the hydrological regressions there are
the oddities of Two or more voting statistically more in House and POTUS elections while
Asians and Natives statistically vote less in the same elections. Again the the question
why needs asked.
Climatological had 12 and geophysical had 20 disaster events in this study’s timeframe,
1990-2016. Of these climatological events occurred in 4 states and geophysical in 2 states.
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Because of the low frequency of disasters one must consider the small sample size when
interpreting those regression results.
One possibility for explaining the differences within minority groups comes from the
makeup of the minority group. Chinese, Filipinos, Vietnamese, Koreans, Japanese, and
Indians are the the largest of America’s Asian groups. Although they are Asian they are
not a homogenous group. Chinese and Indians speak different languages, Japanese and
Filipinos may have different religions, and each of these groups have different customs and
cultures. Yet, they are grouped in a homogenous variable and the differences dismissed
and thus disguised in the regression analysis. The same issue exists in Hispanics, e.g.
Cuban Americans and Mexican Americans. These Hispanics have different cultures and
language variations yet again are clumped together in one variable, Hispanics. Blacks,
native and foreign born, and Native Americans are classified similarly as the previous
groups even though differences exist. Most of the Two or more race people in this dataset
come primarily from two locations, Hawaii and eastern Oklahoma. This may explain
some of the anomaly of this race category results. More likely this race category lacks
accuracy because of undercounting in the census.
Election candidates need aware of these differences between the election turnout of
minorities. This study shows candidates, especially in a highly contested race, that mi-
norities may make the difference between winning and losing especially with the changing
of American demographics. Based on this study Asians and Hispanics are more statisti-
cally significant in all four elections and Asians by far more inclined to vote than their
Hispanic neighbors. Blacks are disengaged, according to the regression results, from the
political process by all four elections but this could change if candidates possibly appealed
to them and fulfilled their promises to these constituents. House and Senate candidates
need to engage Natives as well because they too are not involved in voting under nearly
all disaster conditions.
The Democrat percentage in terms of the DV, election candidate total to potential




This study evaluated minority races and ethnicities on a county level. Whites were
excluded from the study but future research on natural disasters could study the effect
onWhite voters to examine if the results show similar results in the same disaster counties.
If the assumption for this study holds, Whites will vote regardless of a disaster or not,
such a study would determine if the assumption has validity.
Time is not addressed in this study except for the year the disaster occurred and
the election. Future research could calculate the number of days/weeks/months from
the date of the disaster to the election. This would specifically determine if time needs
considered in the analysis. Does a disaster in January have the same impact as one in
late October before the election? If these disasters do impact the election, what is the
tipping point in terms of time that the effect occurs? Six weeks or six months? These
hypothetical questions would further the disaster and voting behavior literature.
Geographical location as in terms of voting also provides future analysis especially
within or between states or county regions. For example, Oklahoma leads the nation
in meteorological disasters with 45, Indiana and Kentucky have 17 and 12, respectfully.
Table 9. Within these three states does voter behavior change when compared between
these states and does behavior change between disaster counties and those non-disaster
counties in the same state? These questions need considered in future research.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Governor statistical diagnostic checks
The following statistical summary, xtsum results, and other various checks for het-
eroscedasticity, test for random effects, Hausman test, Wooldridge autocorrelation test,
modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity in the fixed effect regression, and
the Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence.
Overall statistics are “between” statistics are calculated on the basis of summary
statistics of 3,113 regardless of year. “Within” statistics are calculated on the basis of
summary statistics of 6.84838 year regardless of FIPS.
The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test shows to reject the null and this
study will then not use Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) because of significant
differences across FIPS. The Hausman test results has a p-value of 0.0000 requiring a
rejection of the null hypothesis so this study will use the fixed effects model.
The modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in the fixed effects regression
shows homoscedasticity exits in this model as the p-value equals zero.
The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data tests, shown below, indicates
H0: no first-order autocorrelation.
The Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence has too few common observations across
the panel.
Table 20: Governor xtsum results
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N/n/T-bar
climatalogical overall 0.000546 0.0233613 0 1 N=21977
between 0.0116149 0 0.5 n=3113
within 0.0198928 -0.499454 0.875546 T-bar=7.059749
geophysical overall 0.00091 0.0301539 0 1 N=21977
between 0.011894 0 0.25 n=3113
within 0.0273862 -0.24909 0.87591 T-bar=7.059749
hydrological overall 0.0021386 0.0461966 0 1 N=21977
between 0.0173439 0 0.1666667 n=3113
within 0.0428408 -0.1645281 0.8771386 T-bar=7.059749
meteorological overall 0.0082359 0.0903793 0 1 N=21977
between 0.033265 0 0.2857143 n=3113
Continued on next page
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Table 20 – continued from previous page
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N/nT-bar
within 0.0840266 -0.2774784 0.8832359 T-bar=7.059749
gov margin overall 6001.586 19730.45 0 705745 N=21977
between 16639.81 15.85714 322055.8 n=3113
within 10204.69 -272422.2 389690.8 T-bar=7.059749
gov Dem % overall 0.427338 0.1504757 0.0108 0.9161 N=21977
between 0.1059191 0.1098286 0.8467143 n=3113
within 0.1067461 0.0105952 0.8649095 T-bar=7.059749
Asian % overall 0.0095787 0.0256379 0 0.6630407 N=21977
between 0.0248199 0 0.5906883 n=3113
within 0.0057462 -0.104027 0.1127218 T-bar=7.059749
Black % overall 0.0801489 0.1339061 0 0.8415765 N=21977
between 0.1345151 0 0.836018 n=3113
within 0.0118219 -0.1856296 0.3030092 T-bar=7.059749
Hispanic % overall 0.057315 0.1143257 0 0.9741961 N=21977
between 0.1123045 0 0.9647408 n=3113
within 0.0212441 -0.1453889 0.2344527 T-bar=7.059749
Native % overall 0.0134532 0.0564479 0 0.9252143 N=21977
between 0.0567458 0 0.9135526 n= 3113
within 0.0042865 -0.0986582 0.1011749 T-bar=7.059749
Two % overall 0.0053132 0.0079057 0 0.1959335 N=21977
between 0.0050002 0 0.1050165 n=3113
within 0.0061282 -0.0997033 0.0962302 T-bar=7.059749
Overall statistics are ordinary statistics that are based on 21,977 observations. “Be-
tween” statistics are calculated on the basis of summary statistics of 3,113 regardless of
year. “Within” statistics are calculated on the basis of summary statistics of 7.059749




























































































































































































































































































































































Race and natural disasters, race and race show no correlation in the governor model
has correlation for 21,977 observations.
5.2 House statistical diagnostics checks
Overall statistics are ordinary statistics that are based on 40,182 observations. Overall
statistics are “between” statistics are calculated on the basis of summary statistics of 3,113
regardless of year. “Within” statistics are calculated on the basis of summary statistics
of 12.90781 year regardless of FIPS.
The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test shows to reject the null and this
study will then not use Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) because of significant
differences across FIPS. The Hausman test results has a p-value of 0.0000 requiring a
rejection of the null hypothesis so this study will use the fixed effects model.
The modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in the fixed effects regression
shows homoscedasticity exits in this model as the p-value equals zero.
The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data tests, shown below, indicates
H0: no first-order autocorrelation.
The Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence has too few common observations across
the panel.
Table 22: House xtsum results
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N/n/T-bar
climatalogical overall .0008959 .0299189 0 1 40182
between .011549 0 .3846154 3113
within .027594 -.3837195 .9239728 12.90781
geophysical overall .0005475 .0233928 0 1 40182
between .008022 0 .1538462 3113
within .0219643 -.1532986 .9236244 12.90781
hydrological overall .0034344 .0585035 0 1 40182
between .016166 0 .1538462 3113
within .0562415 -.1504118 .9265113 12.90781
meteorological overall .0126674 .1118357 0 1 40182
between .0337926 0 .3846154 3113
within .1066392 -.371948 .9357443 12.90781
margin overall 9111.361 31841.2 0 1509302 40182
Continued on next page
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Table 22 – continued from previous page
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N/n/T-bar
between 28720.49 45.38462 788542.7 3113
within 13604.69 -552779.3 729870.7 12.90781
house Dem % overall .4034307 .2195039 0 1 40182
between .1610331 .0541692 .9070308 3113
within .1490789 -.3568308 1.170592 12.90781
Asian % overall .0100352 .0257363 0 .6630407 40182
between .0250452 0 .5839941 3113
within .0056113 -.094246 .1321198 12.90781
Black % overall .0818106 .1350909 0 .841649 40182
between .1350392 0 .835332 3113
within .0112147 -.1769933 .3028204 12.90781
Hispanic % overall .0600416 .1164405 0 .9741961 40182
between .1143582 .001244 .9642776 3113
within .0202377 -.1448628 .2294861 12.90781
Native % overall .0136615 .0569062 0 .9326445 40182
between .0571286 0 .9163974 3113
within .0039381 -.0889121 .086662 12.90781
Two % overall .0060619 .0082955 0 .1984241 40182
between .0058681 0 .1273352 3113

























































































































































































































































































































































Race and natural disasters, race and race show no correlation. Disasters and disasters,
disasters and election variables used in this study show no correlation.
5.3 POTUS statistical diagnostic checks
Overall statistics are ordinary statistics that are based on 21,786 observations. Overall
statistics are “between” statistics are calculated on the basis of summary statistics of 3,114
regardless of year. “Within” statistics are calculated on the basis of summary statistics
of 6.996146 year regardless of FIPS.
The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test shows to reject the null and this
study will then not use Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) because of significant
differences across FIPS. The Hausman test results has a p-value of 0.0000 requiring a
rejection of the null hypothesis so this study will use the fixed effects model.
The modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in the fixed effects regression
shows homoscedasticity exits in this model as the p-value equals zero.
The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data tests, shown below, indicates
H0: no first-order autocorrelation.
The Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence has too few common observations across
the panel.
Table 24: POTUS xtsum results
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N/n/T-bar
climatalogical overall .0011934 .0345262 0 1 N=21786
between .0134959 0 .2857143 n=3114
within .0317784 -.2845209 .8583363 T-bar=6.996146
geophysical overall .0005508 .0234635 0 1 N=21786
between .0088525 0 .1428571 n=3114
within .0217289 -.1423063 .8576937 T-bar=6.996146
hydrological overall .0043606 .0658922 0 1 N=21786
between .0245723 0 .1428571 n=3114
within .0611378 -.1384965 .8615035 T-bar=6.996146
meteorological overall .017167 .1298963 0 1 N=21786
between .0524157 0 .5714286 n=3114
within .1188489 -.5542616 .8743098 T-bar=6.996146
Continued on next page
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Table 24 – continued from previous page
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N/n/T-bar
POTUS margin overall 8267.863 36078.93 0 1694621 N=21786
between 34258.54 18.14286 1052387 n=3114
within 11302.47 -397197.6 650501.4 T-bar=6.996146
POTUS Dem % overall .3911254 .1341619 .0314 .9246 N=21786
between .118289 .0962429 .8834286 n=3114
within .0634818 .0515396 .6221111 T-bar=6.996146
Asian % overall .0100607 .0256282 0 .6489763 N=21786
between .0249467 0 .5807456 n=3114
within .0058846 -.0929821 .1333933 T-bar=6.996146
Black % overall .082643 .1356434 0 .8389262 N=21786
between .1351157 0 .8352631 n=3114
within .01189 -.1715435 .3029644 T-bar=6.996146
Hispanic % overall .0599505 .1162497 0 .972569 N=21786
between .1142726 .0021331 .964191 n=3114
within .0212962 -.1425652 .2299442 T-bar=6.996146
Native % overall .0136298 .0565032 0 .9326445 N=21786
between .0570085 0 .9159086 n=3114
within .0040688 -.0855463 .0867093 T-bar=6.996146
Two % overall .0062902 .0083898 0 .1984241 N=21786
between .0060674 0 .1314632 n=3114



























































































































































































































































































































































Race and natural disasters, race and race show no correlation. Disasters and disasters,
disasters and election variables used in this study show no correlation.
5.4 Senate statistical diagnostic checks
Overall statistics are ordinary statistics that are based on 28,860 observations. Overall
statistics are “between” statistics are calculated on the basis of summary statistics of 3,113
regardless of year. “Within” statistics are calculated on the basis of summary statistics
of 9.2708 year regardless of FIPS.
The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test shows to reject the null and this
study will then not use Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) because of significant
differences across FIPS. The Hausman test results has a p-value of 0.0000 requiring a
rejection of the null hypothesis so this study will use the fixed effects model.
The modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in the fixed effects regression
shows homoscedasticity exits in this model as the p-value equals zero.
The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data tests, shown below, indicates
H0: no first-order autocorrelation.
The Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence has too few common observations across
the panel.
Table 26: Senate xtsum results
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N/n/T-bar
climatalogical overall .0008663 .0294199 0 1 N=28860
between .0124065 0 .3333333 n=3113
within .0267605 -.3324671 .8897551 T-bar=9.2708
geophysical overall .0005891 .0242636 0 1 N=28860
between .0102684 0 .2222222 n=3113
within .0220413 -.2216332 .90968 T-bar=9.2708
hydrological overall .0032918 .0572803 0 1 N=28860
between .0184646 0 .1111111 n=3113
within .054213 -.1078194 .9123827 T-bar=9.2708
meteorological overall .0122661 .110073 0 1 N=28860
between .0381663 0 .3333333 n=3113
within .1031136 -.3210672 .921357 T-bar=9.2708
senate margin overall 7632.149 30616.69 0 1314730 N=28860
Continued on next page
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Table 26 – continued from previous page
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N/n/T-bar
between 27491.19 18.22222 735509.9 n=3113
within 13574.04 -494527.6 593770.4 T-bar=9.2708
senate Dem % overall .4284418 .1662094 0 1 N=28860
between .1222889 .0958692 .8485222 n=3113
within .1134283 -.1292995 1.019145 T-bar=9.2708
Asian % overall .0096977 .026415 0 .6630407 N=28860
between .0249233 0 .5837483 n=3113
within .0058409 -.0902508 .1243725 T-bar=9.2708
Black % overall .0822641 .1352777 0 .841649 N=28860
between .1346082 0 .8350096 N=3113
within .0117999 -.1768639 .3065949 T-bar=9.2708
Hispanic % overall .0573281 .1135888 0 .972569 N=28860
between .1129884 0 .9646037 n=3113
within .0211406 -.1452609 .2405585 T-bar=9.2708
Native % overall .0136004 .0557783 0 .9326445 N=28860
between .0566341 0 .9139262 n=3113
within .0041881 -.0938215 .0860433 T-bar=9.2708
Two % overall .0056237 .0084101 0 .1984241 N=28860
between .0051822 0 .1181871 n=3113
























































































































































































































































































































































Race and natural disasters, race and race show no correlation in the Senate model.
This correlation table is based upon 28,860 observations.
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